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Abstract 
Universal Basic Income is receiving increasing attention as an alternative form of social 
protection that can combat issues on poverty and inequality in developing countries. Yet, 
knowledge on this field is contentious and spurs controversy in academia. This study 
therefore sets out to investigate whether the concept of Universal Basic Income is 
compatible with the existing neoliberal development paradigm. This framework is founded 
on a justification that the existing development paradigm is based on neoliberal ideas. 
This study first examines neoliberal conceptions on individual behaviour through 
theoretical assumptions of individual freedom and rational choice in relation to empirical 
data from the recent Universal Basic Income pilot project in Madhya Pradesh, India. It is 
deduced that recipients of Universal Basic Income in Madhya Pradesh gained economic 
freedom and generally seemed to utilise this freedom to act rational. The study then 
examines the neoliberal conception of structure in terms of market and state relations with 
the defined conceptual approach of Universal Basic Income, whilst applying knowledge 
from the former analysis on Madhya Pradesh in order to contextualise the analysis. In 
theorem, it is found that Universal Basic Income contradicts with the neoliberal idea of a 
market-driven economy since it provides a basic income to all residents of a society, 
universally. On the other hand, a contextual analysis indicated that the observed effects of 
a basic income also aligns with market-orientated ideas. 
Based on this research design, the study finally concludes that Universal Basic Income is 
not overall compatible with the existing neoliberal development paradigm. The project 
argues that implementing Universal Basic Income may be challenging, since it is a 
universal social protection scheme that both lacks fiscal feasibility and contradicts with the 
existing neoliberal approach. Despite this, it can be reasoned from a neoliberal perspective 
that the prospects of Universal Basic Income could be implemented if a basic income acted 
as a temporary economic catalyser that targeted people suffering from extreme poverty 
and integrated them in the formal market economy. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Field of Investigation and Problem Statement 
International development scholars have over the last decades shown increasing concern 
on issues surrounding global inequality and poverty. On April 23rd 2014, the economist 
Thomas Piketty stated in a talk with Foreign Affairs: 
“I think inequality is fine, as long as it is in the common interest. The problem is when it 
gets so extreme, when it becomes excessive” (Foreign Affairs 2014). 
As Piketty points out, inequality can potentially have extensive social and economic conse-
quences if the gap becomes too excessive. Inequality is on the rise on a global scale with 
new assessments indicating that it has never been higher since data collection began 
(OECD 2015:3). These disturbing tendencies are feared to obstruct the economic develop-
ment and pose a worldwide threat to the prospects of continuous growth (OECD 2014). 
This is the story of a problem that has been haunting mankind for centuries. Innumerable 
different strategies, policies, methods and concepts have been carried out to counteract 
poverty and inequality. The different solutions seem to be in a state of constant progress, 
as experiences are accumulated and ideas are developed further, but are nevertheless in-
fluenced by internal and external ideological and methodological discussions and disa-
greements. The dominant global development agenda has over the last decades been 
heavily influenced by international economic institutions like the IMF, The World Bank 
and WTO, prescribing neoliberal policies of market liberation in the Global South, best 
exemplified by means structural adjustment programmes (CGDEV 2015, Doane 2011, 
O’Brien & Williams 2013:232). Meanwhile, the policy strategies prescripted by the afore-
mentioned institutions coincides with the approach to economic development, embraced 
by international organisations such as the UN, ILO and a wide range of NGO’s. 
The widespread consensus surrounding the UN 2015 MDGs and subsequent success in 
reducing absolute poverty leaves some promises, when common goals are agreed upon and 
followed through. However, the apparent threat posed by the rising inequality calls for new 
approaches and strategies, paving the road for a new doctrine of Social Protection, cur-
rently being debated heavily amongst the most influential development actors. While the 
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neoliberal development paradigm represents a draconian view of the role and responsibili-
ties of the state, market, human beings and on the general structural composition of the 
optimum society, this new approach calls for increasing state intervention as a measure to 
counter the rising challenges of inequality. Social protection consist of many elements 
which aims to ensure a higher degree of social inclusion, as well as reduce poverty, vulner-
ability and inequality through securing citizens certain rights and services (ILO 2015). 
Where impact evaluation results are available, they show that new forms of Social Protec-
tion have reduced poverty and raised human development (UNRISD 2010). One conceptu-
al branch of Social Protection is concerned with direct cash transfer programmes. These 
programmes differ in their general focus and aim, but all have in common that they trans-
fer a certain amount of cash directly to recipients, as an element of social protection. 
One particular conception of cash transfer subject to increasing attention is the Universal 
Basic Income (UBI). This specific concept prescribes unconditional cash transfers to all 
members of a society, at such a level adequate to fulfil basic needs. This contentious social 
policy is usually advocated by explicit left wing or Marxist scholars, and is inherently sur-
rounded with much scepticism and critique from mainstream development scholars and 
policy makers (Standing 2012:60ff). Albeit, eye opening results from unconditional social 
protection schemes appear from the periphery, showcasing promising perspectives in 
terms of both human capital and economic growth. This apparently incommensurable 
concept is gradually climbing the stairs into the mainstream development stage, earning 
mention in renowned journals and papers of influential international development actors 
by means of promising results (UNRISD 2010; UN 2012). It is however still a stage set by 
strong transnational economic actors, carved by the ideals of market driven development 
and growth coupled with minimal state interference, wherein this controversy of future 
development goals and policies is taking place. 
It is from this paradox, this apparent clash of paradigms, that our interest arises. Could 
such an egalitarian and redistributive policy fit inside the contemporary neoliberal devel-
opment framework of market liberation? The current academic debate on UBI is largely 
comprised of fearsome supporters and sceptics, in term arguing in a polemic and biased 
manner, firmly rested in their point of view. This project tries to take a step back and as-
sess the larger picture, without a firm stand in either camp, thereby hopefully adding a 
more nuanced perspective on the debate on the entitlement of UBI in the contemporary 
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neoliberal development landscape. It is with an outset in these reflections that the problem 
statement of this paper is formulated as followed: 
How is Universal Basic Income as a form of Social Protection compatible 
with the existing neoliberal development paradigm? 
 
1.1. Research Questions 
In order to answer the problem statement in the most competent way, several aspects 
needs to be considered. Initially, we find it fundamental to investigate theoretical and con-
ceptual ideas of Universal Basic Income in order to acquire knowledge on the contempo-
rary perception of UBI and to generate a definition. Moreover, it is essential for us to ex-
amine neoliberal theory to set parameters for further research. In order to delimit theoret-
ical aspects of the neoliberal paradigm and to concretise the frame that UBI is examined 
within, we find it operationaliseable to set two parameters on an individual level as well as 
two on a structural level, based on neoliberal theoretical assumptions. 
When a theoretical framework is set, we find it substantial to analyse the compatibility of 
Universal Basic Income with parameterised neoliberal theories on individual behaviour. 
This is established to examine the theoretical behavioural assumptions of neoliberalism in 
relation to the actions of Basic Income recipients from the pilot projects in the Indian state 
of Madhya Pradesh. This leads us to pose the following research question: 
What effect did Universal Basic Income have on the individual behaviour of 
recipients in Madhya Pradesh, India? 
The results of this analysis justifies an examination of UBI in relation to the parameterized 
neoliberal conception of the optimum state-market relation on a structural level. We find it 
appropriate to examine this relation with neoliberal theoretical assumptions along with 
conceptual ideas of UBI, whilst applying knowledge from the former analysis of empirical 
data from the pilots in Madhya Pradesh in order to contextualise this investigation. This 
leaves us with the following question: 
How does Universal Basic Income comply with the neoliberal conception of 
the optimum state-market relation on a structural level? 
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The conclusions derived from the the two analyses will provide us with a degree of 
knowledge how UBI can be compatible with neoliberal approaches to both individual be-
haviour and conception of state-market relation. In order to investigate UBI as a form of 
Social Protection, these results will be utilised in an analytical discussion of the entitlement 
of Universal Basic Income as a form of Social Protection within the established neoliberal 
development paradigm.   
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2 Methodological  
Reflections 
This chapter reflects on methodological considera-
tions and choices that the project has taken in order 
to answer the problem statement as comprehensive-
ly as possible. It implies explaining and reflecting 
critically on the intentions behind the research de-
sign, choices of theories and concepts, methodologi-
cal approach, as well as central delimitations in the 
project.  !!!!!!
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2 Methodological Reflections 
2.1 Research Design 
This section will draw a blueprint of the project’s overall research design; the progression 
of the analysis and subsequent interconnectedness with the discussion and how this will 
lead us to an answer to our initial problem formulation. This entails general reflections on 
the logic of the structure before data collection and analysis begins (de Vaus 2001:9).!
As stated in the problem formulation, this project seeks to investigate the compatibility of 
UBI with the neoliberal development paradigm. The concrete analysis of compatibility 
rests on the premise that the contemporary development strategies utilised by the most 
influential nations and transnational economic institutions, such as IMF and The World 
Bank, are rooted in neoclassical economic reasoning (see. 2.3.). From this notion, our in-
vestigation of the entitlement of a UBI scheme in contemporary developmental practice 
will thus revolve around the questioning of whether UBI complies with the reasoning of 
the most powerful global actors of economic development. In the project, this reasoning is 
operationalised by identifying central writings of the most renowned neoclassical and ne-
oliberal scholars in order to identify the economic rationales behind existing neoliberalism, 
resolving in a deduction of four core parameters, which can be said to represent key prop-
erties of neoliberalism. There is always alternative ways of interpreting neoliberal theory, 
why this research involves a degree of subjectivity. Yet, these normative neoliberal ration-
ales that the theoretical framework draws upon has been examined and evaluated in the 
process and will thus be adopted throughout the analysis. !
The first two parameters are comprised from the notion that the empirical data of the two 
UBI pilot projects from the district of Madhya Pradesh in India could explain the effect of 
UBI on individual behaviour in this specific context (see. 2.4.2.). The assessment of the 
pilots consist of a range of statistical data as well as interpreted material that are evaluated 
in line with the conceptual ideas of UBI. These parameters thus analyse this empirical data 
against neoliberal rationales of individual freedom and rational choice in order to assess 
the effect of basic income on recipients behaviour. In choosing this strategy of research, it 
is known that the analytical results based on the pilots cannot be generalised to other con-
texts, though can be used as an indicator of the potential effects of UBI as a tool of Social 
Protection. The final two parameters are comprised from the notion that the defined ap-
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proach of UBI, in theorem, could to some extent explain the concepts compatibility with 
neoliberal conception of structure. These final parameters comprise the neoliberal percep-
tion of market and state and when analysed again the conceptual approach of UBI, will 
contribute to the understanding of the overall compatibility. In this analysis, the line of 
reasoning is supplemented with examples from the pilots in order to contextualise and 
convey the newfound knowledge of the previous analysis. !
Within this analytical framework, our epistemology will largely be aligned with properties 
and assumptions consistent in neoliberal behavioral theory. These economic theories are 
formulated on basis of a nomothetic ideal of science, rooted in rationalism and aiming to 
formulate universal and stable laws of rational human agency, presupposing a deductive 
mode of research that we will adopt in the epistemology of our analysis. The structure and 
progression of analysis will thus be guided by the theoretical constructs, in aim to answer 
our research question. It can then be argued that the epistemology of the analysis to some 
extend draws upon a positivist perception by utilizing the rationales behind neoliberalism, 
that builds upon neoclassical economical presuppositions, in order to create findings that 
can be drawn to a broader discussion of the entitlement of UBI as a form of Social Protec-
tion (Bhattacherjee 2012:104). Nevertheless, this structure of research involves a high de-
gree of analytical interpretation, which deviates from the positivist rationale that subjectiv-
ity should be excluded in research (Juul & Pedersen 2013:401).!
It can be reasoned that the ontology of the study to some extent includes an acknowledge-
ment of constructivist ideas, since this research accept the power of discourse in relation to 
the supposed neoliberal development paradigm. This approach is apparent in designing 
the analytical discussion of the project, which will revolve around the findings of the above 
mentioned analysis, relating these to are broader discussion of the entitlement of UBI in 
the new emerging development framework of Social Protection. It applies more of an in-
terpretive epistemology, drawing upon our analytical results with a wider spectrum of nu-
anced inputs from reports of international development agencies and a processed qualita-
tive interview with the Independent Consultant in Governance and Social Protection, 
Rasmus Schjødt (see. 2.4.6.). The structure is generally designed in order to ensure that 
the study as precisely as possible can answer the problem statement, as well as provide an 
comprehensive line of argumentation in our contribution to this field of research.  
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2.2 Bias and Normativity 
In order to conduct a fully transparent research, it is important to clarify and reflect on the 
bias and normativity of the researchers. In Denmark, an ample social welfare security sys-
tem, and a society known for a relatively low degree of inequality, is the norm that influ-
ences our fundamental approach to the project. This paper therefore recognises that the 
existence of a normative reality, in our case the situational context, can mold and influence 
researchers in their approach to scientific inquiry. Our reflections have led to a distinct 
positive view of Danish “welfare-mindset” that includes ensuring social security to all citi-
zens. This mindset influences our perspective on development and Social Protection, thus 
also the normative presumption of this research, especially the focus on UBI. It is also im-
portant to point out that we acknowledge that the world is in a constant process of globali-
sation, which also determines the dominant development paradigm, that we define as be-
ing influenced by neoliberalism. 
2.3 Choice and Application of Theory 
The project uses a number of concepts and theories to answer to the problem statement. 
The application of these concepts and theories will be described in the following section, 
followed by a critical reflection on the adequacy in answering the research questions of the 
project.!
2.3.1 Universal Basic Income 
The concept of UBI in a developmental context has been used as this paper’s main area of 
investigation. UBI as a specific form of social security system is an alternative to traditional 
forms of providing Social Protection in developing countries, which is why we find it inter-
esting to examine. The concept has furthermore been tested by comprehensive pilot stud-
ies in India, which makes it possible for us to examine the effects on individuals in this 
specific case empirically. The project has adopted the conceptual background of UBI from 
the uniform group of scholars, groups and individuals, Basic Income Earth Network 
(BIEN), in order to have a coherent and clear target of research. This choice was made 
while considering that this conceptual understanding was the one applied in the Indian 
pilots. Nevertheless, adopting this interpretation of UBI have influenced the analytical fo-
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cus to include a certain degree of reproduction of the thoughts and mindset of the BIEN 
scholars, which can seemingly make the depiction of the concept slightly limited.!
2.3.2 Neoliberalism - Individual Freedom, Rational Choice and the concept of 
Market and State 
Neoliberalism is used as the main theoretical framework of the project in which UBIs com-
patibility is to be examined. This is chosen since our research defines neoliberalism as be-
ing influential in the existing development paradigm. Neoclassical economics and theoreti-
cal concepts of core neoliberal scholars are applied as analytical tools in the investigation 
including individual freedom, rational choice and the neoliberal conception of market and 
state. Neoliberalism as an academic paradigm closely rests upon neoclassical economic 
theory, why this theoretical standpoint has been applied (Stilwell 2012:207). This critical 
reflection on the use of neoliberalism will be elaborated on in the section on delimitations 
(see. 2.5.).!
2.4 Empirical data 
The project uses methodological qualitative and quantitative empirical data in order to 
answer the problem statement. The following sections covers source criticism, a presenta-
tion of the pilot projects in India and a review of the applied quantitative data.!
2.4.1 Source criticism 
This project applies sources that describes and evaluates the Indian pilots in order to con-
textualise the concept of UBI. We use two primary sources to cover the qualitative and 
quantitative results from the pilots. The first source is the book, Basic Income - A Trans-
formative Policy for India (2015), that presents the results from the pilots in an accessible 
way, which makes the results manageable. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the 
authors of this book are personally engaged and dedicated to the project. Consequently, 
this means that the possibility of an angled version of the pilots cannot be excluded, 
whereby it is necessary to be aware of possible bias. 
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The second source is the report, Piloting Basic Income Transfers in Madhya Pradesh, In-
dia (2014), published by UNICEF, which is a very detailed evaluation of the results. The 
report provides a clear picture of the methodology of the pilots, increasing transparency of 
the pilot. On the other hand, the pilots have been funded by UNICEF, why it is essential to 
have in mind that the outcome might be influenced by this. 
As a supplement to the abovementioned sources, the report, Cash Transfer: A Review of 
the Issues of India, is also applied. This report is published by UNICEF as well, authored 
by Professor of Development Studies Guy Standing1. Standing is Co-President of the Basic 
Income Earth Network (BIEN), why this report might represent a biased agenda.!
2.4.2 Pilot Projects 
While investigating the applicability of UBI in a neoliberal theoretical framework, we find 
it advantageous to make use of a pilot project as an contextualising examplication. The UBI 
pilot projects conducted in the Indian province of Madhya Pradesh thus serve as a primary 
source of empirical data for this project. Madhya Pradesh was chosen in favor to cash-
transfer pilots in Brazil and Namibia, which will be elaborated on in delimitations (see. 
2.5.). The project examines this pilot due to the fact that is was the most extensively con-
ducted UBI pilot to date with a very thorough methodology coupled a high degree of trans-
parency. Some key points of the research design of the pilot: !
● The pilots are funded by UNICEF, and conducted in collaboration with the Self-
Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) and relevant state actors (UNICEF 
2014:70). 
● The participants, as well as control villages, are selected from randomized control 
trial, correcting for socio-economic conditions (UNICEF: 2014:59f). 
● Evaluation and monitoring is done before, during and after the pilots have taken 
place by independent research teams  (UNICEF 2014: 61f). 
● Working hypothesis are explicitly made available, as well as regression data, Z-
scores and other intermediate data used in the quantitative data processing of the 
final assessment  (UNICEF 2014:64ff.). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!1948&:!Professor!of!Development!Studies!and!PhD!in!economics!from!Cambridge!University.!
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The pilots made generalisations based on quantitative data surveys drawn from popula-
tions. As the methods employed, and the general design of the pilots, are well-founded, the 
results that were obtained, functions as an exemplification of the effects or results of im-
plementing UBI in a developing country.!
Despite the premise that the empirical data procured from the pilots seem valid, it is still 
important to keep in mind that agents who represent specific agendas might be present in 
the utilised material. An example of agents that has had substantial influence on the em-
pirical data at hand is Sarath Davala and Renana Jhabvala, who are respectively a Senior 
Researcher and President of the Indian SEWA. The fact that this NGO was actively en-
gaged in several stages of the pilot, is possible to enable some sort of agency that can influ-
ence the general approach and design of these pilots. Although different agencies are pre-
sumed to be present in the empirical data, this was not considered as an influence that 
could or would taint the empirical results. When assessing these agencies and discerning 
their effect on different areas of the paper, it has been a focal point to keep these concerns 
in mind when utilising results from the empirical data. The mere awareness of the pres-
ence of agents or agencies is very important, as this paper seeks to analyse, discuss and 
conclude as unbiased as possible. Finally, it is vital to keep in mind that these pilots in In-
dia will not provide knowledge and data that can be generalised and applied on a larger 
scale. !
2.4.3 Quantitative empirical data 
In this project, we have not been producing quantitative data, but the processing of exist-
ing quantitative data will be present. The quantitative data used in this project is thereby of 
secondary character, and is retrieved from the Basic Income pilot projects in Madhya Pra-
desh. In our use of empirical data we draw on quantitative statistics and data from which 
we analyse, reflect and conclude, in order to elaborate our empirical exemplification. The 
quantitative data utilised in this paper consists of documentation and evaluation on the 
results from the pilot projects in Madhya Pradesh.!
When using secondary data, it is important to put the quality of the data and methods into 
question, and be critical. In this way it is possible to use the data the most appropriate way 
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according to the main research question of the project (Clement & Ingemann 2007:51f). It 
is therefore important to have in mind that a certain degree of bias may be prevalent in the 
material. As such, the studies we have used in this paper can be seen as research that 
strives towards a minimum of influence. The researchers who conducted the pilots can, to 
a certain degree, have an impact on the way the results are presented in the evaluation ma-
terial. In this specific pilot it is of importance to note that Standing is a major advocate for 
UBI, and that he thus can be deemed as a somewhat biased researcher. Nevertheless the 
methods applied in the pilots and the funding and support provided by UNICEF can wit-
ness and underline the validity of the empirical data utilised in this paper.!
2.4.4 Qualitative data processing and methodology 
This project employs qualitative data processing by applying the Indian pilots as secondary 
data. We have chosen to characterise the methodological use of the pilots as an contextual 
exemplification since a thorough case study is not performed. The use of only a single ex-
emplification does not coincide with generalising analysis solely on the basis of the pilots, 
but rather a tool to understand, analyse and interpret on theory that is employed in prac-
tice. This categorization is deliberately chosen since this research delimits from cultural, 
geographical or social factors when employing the empirical data in the analysis.!
In conducting a case study, context dependence would have been employed by a researcher 
in order to understand the total and deepest nature of the case in principle, thus taking all 
aspects into account of the context that the case resides in (Flyvbjerg 2010:463f). It is 
therefore evident that this study does not expect the results attained in India to be of a 
generalisable or projectable character, but we acknowledge the fact that the practicing and 
employment of an exemplification may indicate effects of a concept in specific context, 
which is why the results from the pilots are conveyed. This methodological observation will 
be reflected in the last chapter of the project (see. 10).!
2.4.5 The use of Secondary Data 
This paper conducts research by the inherent use and analysis of secondary data as the 
primary empirical source. It can partly be ascribed to the fact that primary data gathering 
is time consuming and in this study irrelevant - it would for instance not be feasible or re-
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alistic to conduct a UBI pilot ourselves. This project justifies its methodological use of sec-
ondary data by reviewing the transparency and methodological approach of the pilots in 
India (see. 2.4.2.). It is though important to continually question the causality of the em-
pirical conclusions that are brought forth from the secondary data (Bhattacherjee 
2012:39). The scientific credibility of the secondary data, utilised in the paper, is a key fac-
tor. As UNICEF is generally accepted as a major contributor and partner in a development 
context, and the fact that these pilots have been funded and cooperated with UNICEF, 
adds to the credibility of this data.!
2.4.6 Interview 
This section will run through the usage of an interview, starting with a presentation of the 
general methodological considerations as well as design of questions, and end in a presen-
tation of the participant, Rasmus Schjødt.!
2.4.6.1 Considerations regarding interview 
A semi-structured interview was performed with an expert on Social Protection in order to 
gather empirical knowledge on this field of research (Harrits et. al. 2012:149). In applying 
interview as a method of empirical data generation, it was vital to create the questions as 
broad and unbiased as possible. This was done with the intention to get a neutral assess-
ment of Social Protection and UBI, while seeking alternate views on the problem at hand, 
complementing other aspects than the data and literature already employed. The interview 
is used to supplement the analytical discussion of this paper, leaving a more nuanced and 
practical overview on this topic.!
The interview was carried out per email, as the respondent is currently residing in Myan-
mar. There are obvious difficulties related to making an interview from a distance com-
pared to a face-to-face interview. It was for instance not possible to elaborate on the ques-
tions or answers of the respondent, leaving the interviewee in control of his answers, and 
the manner he assess the natural progression of the interview (Meho 2006:1289). Meth-
odological limitations of an interview conducted via email can thereby consist of the fact 
that the interviewee is likely to answer the questions in a way that he sees fit, in regards to 
his own knowledge and pre-existing bias. These considerations have all been taken into 
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account in order to get most desirable outcome of the interview that can help answering 
the problem statement. !
2.4.6.2 Profile of the interview respondent 
The interviewee chosen for the conducted interview is Rasmus Schjødt, Independent Con-
sultant in Governance and Social Protection, who has an MSc in Political Science and more 
than five years of experience working with International Development in Asia and Africa 
(Schjødt 2015). Schjødt has previously worked with Save the Children and most recently 
with the Center for Economic and Social Development in Myanmar. He is currently based 
in Myanmar, where he is conducting research on Social Protection in South- and Southeast 
Asia. His experience and background on issues of Social Protection in Asia, especially na-
tional schemes and cash-transfer programmes, can offer this project both an extensive and 
more general insight on this topic. Schjødt can furthermore contribute with an unbiased 
view of the UBI pilot projects since he is not professionally involved in the pilots, but has 
researched and visited the project. The interviewee has been asked to consider the follow-
ing subjects2:!
● The future role of Social Protection in developing countries;!
● The qualities of targeted- compared to unconditional social protection programmes;!
● Pros and cons of implementing unconditional protection programmes as well as an 
assessment of the implementability of these in a general context;!
● The compatibility of UBI in a market-orientated approach to social protection;!
● The future and general durability of the Indian pilots;!
● If the perseverance of poverty can be seen as a consequence of the failure of market-
oriented policy.!
2.5 Delimitations 
The project has made several delimitations in choosing the methodology. This section will 
present some of these opting outs and reflect on the influence that they could have had.!
An essential delimitation lies in the deselection of other exemplifications of UBI to support 
the chosen pilot project in Madhya Pradesh. One was the Brazilian Bolsa Familia, a largely !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 The entire interview with Schjødt can be found in Appendix 1.!
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unconditional cash transfer scheme implemented at a nationwide scale, highly praised for 
its positive results in reducing inequality (Wetzel 2013; Suplicy 2008). The case of Bolsa 
Familia was considered, but eventually ruled out, as it is targeted solely at the poorest by 
means of a predefined poverty threshold, ruling out the possibility to investigate the al-
leged positive effects of a truly universal programme (see. 3.1.3.). In comparison, the Indi-
an pilots of Madhya Pradesh employed an understanding of UBI that was very similar to 
the one defined in this paper (see. 3.1.3.) (UNICEF 2014:56ff). Another empirical prospect 
was a UBI pilot study carried out in the Namibian village of Otjivero. While applying an 
understanding of UBI aligned with this project, it had some substantial methodological 
shortcomings in terms of inconsistent epistemology, no control villages and lack of subse-
quent empirical transparency (Osterkamp 2013).  Another essential delimitation is made 
in regards to defining the existing neoliberal development paradigm. By conducting our 
research with neoliberalism as the theoretical framework, we delimit ourselves from sever-
al aspects that, too, have an influence on policy regimes in developing countries. Incorpo-
ration of other theoretical schools could thus have broadened the definition of the para-
digm, and thereby have nuanced the analytical results.!
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3 Conceptualisations 
of Universal Basic 
Income and  
Neoliberalism 
The following chapter consists of a thorough review 
of the two central theoretical conceptions utilised in 
this paper. The theory encompassing UBI will be re-
viewed and outlined, and followed by a definition 
that the conducted research in this paper rests upon. 
This is followed by an account of neoclassical- and 
neoliberal economic thinking as well as an identifi-
cation of the core principles and primary theoretical 
streams contributing to the theoretical concept of 
neoliberalism.! !
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3 Conceptualisations of Universal Basic Income and  
Neoliberalism 
3.1 Universal Basic Income 
This section will begin with a historical literature review of the scholarly debate comprising 
the concept of UBI. This will be followed by an outline of the position of current influential 
UBI scholars, which will lead to a deeper understanding of the properties of the concept in 
order to condensate an ultimate definition that will be utilised throughout the project.!
3.1.1 Literature Review  
In recent years, the idea of a UBI has been increasingly acknowledged as an initiative for 
socio-economic protection. Yet, the scholarly debate on cash transfers, a basic income and 
socio-economic protection dates quite far back in history. What is identified as the proto-
Basic Income has been discussed through history by scholars with adverse intellectual per-
suasions (Raventós 2007:14).!
The idea of basic income grants has its theoretical roots closely bound to the principles of 
the French Revolution. One of the first to compose a detailed written account on how and 
why direct cash transfers to the poor would be desirable was Nicolas de Condorcet3. His 
works were published in 1795 and further elaborated by Thomas Paine4. Paine advocated 
for civil rights in shape of Agrarian Justice, where landowners should pay an amount of 
money to inhabitants on their land, because he thought that uncultivated land is common 
property of the human race (ibid.). Paine stressed that; “(t)his support […] is not of the 
nature of a charity but of a right” (Paine 1792:172). At that time, several other scholars 
expressed thoughts like this. Thomas Spence5, Charles Fourier6, Herbert Spencer7 and 
Henry George8 can be highlighted in this regard (Raventós 2007:14f). As an example, Fou-
rier pointed out that civilisation owes subsistence to everyone who cannot meet his or her 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3!1743-1794: French philosopher, mathematician and political scientist!
4 1797-1809: English/American philosopher and political theorist!
5!1750&1814:!English!political!thinker!
6!1772&1837:!French!philosopher!
7!1820&1903:!English!philosopher!and!sociologist!
8!1839&1897:!American!philosopher!and!economist!
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daily needs by hunting, fishing and gathering food freely. He saw this grant as an uncondi-
tional compensation to the poor for the loss of direct access to natural resources (Clark 
2005:5).!
In the 20th century, the disseminating of the proto-Basic Income idea occurred especially 
in The United Kingdom and The United States. In the UK, Bertrand Russell9 argued for a 
Basic Income of Necessities, with the purpose that a certain amount of money should be 
secured for all citizens, regardless of employment status (Russell 1918). These thoughts 
were brought into political discussions by Dennis Milner10, who made the first lengthy ex-
planation on basic income in English11, arguing for a weekly state bonus for all citizens of 
the UK (Milner 1920). The proposal was not implemented, but Milner’s ideas were soon 
after followed by other intellectuals, who had a common background in the Labour party 
and worked further towards a basic income in different forms (van Parijs 2009:1).!
In the US, a number of concepts related to the notion of a basic income appeared in the 
1960s. The taxation system, known as Negative Income Tax proposed by Milton Fried-
man12 is one notable example (Friedman 2002). According to Friedman, negative income 
tax implies a redistribution depending on annual income, to guarantee a minimum income 
through taxation policy. Richard Nixon13 adopted some of the thoughts in his politics, by 
proposing reforms that should secure guaranteed income, in shape of a Family Assistance 
Plan for workers (Raventós 2007:15f). The reforms did not pass through Congress, and 
were thus abandoned (ibid.).!
In the 1970s and 1980s, the idea of a basic income was spreading to a number of European 
countries, and appeared across the continent in various forms with limited success in 
terms of policy outcomes. In 1986, the concept of basic income went through an important 
change. Up until then, intellectuals and theorists developing the concept seemed to work 
independently and therefore relatively fragmented.!
When a group of French researchers launched a paper on basic income in 1984, it was to 
be the focal point at a congress at the University of Louvain, where several researchers on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9!1872&1970:!British!philosopher!
10!1892&1956:!British!Labour!politician!
11!Higher!Production!by!a!Bonus!on!National!Output.!A!Proposal!for!a!Minimum!Income!for!All!varying!with!National!
Income!
12!1912&2006:!American!economist!
13!1913&1994:!President!of!the!United!States!from!1969!to!1974!
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basic income from different countries were gathered, and culminated in the establishment 
of the Basic Income European Network, BIEN (Raventós 2007:16). The outset of BIEN was 
to unite the different streams and concepts to further the development of what is now re-
ferred to as a Universal Basic Income (UBI). On the tenth congress in Barcelona in 2004, 
the Basic Income European Network was transformed into the Basic Income Earth Net-
work, also abbreviated as BIEN. The transformation was made because of a rising interest 
from scholars originating from countries outside Europe, who asked to be included in the 
network. Subsequently, the BIEN has been the platform for much of the conceptual devel-
opment of UBI.!
3.1.2 Contemporary Positions and Justifications for a Universal Basic Income 
As shown in the previous section, UBI is by no means a completely coherent position and 
is used in various agendas and connotations. In the following, the normative justifications 
of the most renowned voices in the contemporary academic debate of UBI will be intro-
duced.!
One justification for UBI often agitated is rooted in the question of distributive justice and 
ensuring personal liberties, or with the words of John Rawls14 “the worth of liberty” 
(Rawls 1999:179). Here Rawls’ Principle of Difference is applicable, stating that social re-
forms are only just insofar as they distribute real opportunity to those with the fewest, sub-
ject to the respect of everyone’s civil liberties and formal justice (ibid.). An outspoken ad-
vocate of this argumentation is Philippe van Parijs15, which is elaborated thoroughly in his 
books Real freedom for all and What’s wrong with a free lunch? Van Parijs takes what 
could be labelled a left-libertarian approach, stating that a UBI at least at a sufficient of 
subsistence level is a necessity in order to achieve a really free and democratic society and 
provide the ‘material basis on which life can firmly rest’ (van Parijs 2001:3ff.). This uncon-
ditional and regular income will in his view ensure the possibility of the individual to pur-
sue his or her own social or political goals, decoupled from the demands of a continuously 
integrating globalised labour market. Thereby, UBI becomes a rawlesian distribution of 
opportunity - to unpopular artistic or political endeavour, or unpaid or poorly paid devo-
tion to good works and good causes for the benefit of all (ibid.:11f).!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141921&2002:!!American!moral!and!political!philosopher.!
15!1951&:!Belgian!philosopher!and!political!economist,!co&founder!of!BIEN.!
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Along the libertarian lines of van Parijs, but with his own distinct perspective on the bene-
fits of a UBI, is Guy Standing. Standing is likewise a co-founder of BIEN as well as a former 
long-time employee at the International Labour Organization. Standing emphasises the 
need for a UBI in light of increasingly precarious working conditions and imperatives of 
flexible and project-orientated labour arrangements, threatening the liberties of an in-
creasing group of people that he labels The Precariat16. In this post-modern labour market, 
Standing points to UBI both as a necessary form of social protection and as a mean for 
employees to reclaim the bargaining power from the employer. In other words, by means 
of a universal basic economic security, the working individual is able to refuse poor and 
precarious working conditions, without relying on means-testing workfare, that Standing 
identifies as inherently flawed and dis-incenting (Standing 2011:171ff). Thereby, the un-
conditional nature of UBI is emphasised, as a measure to achieve both a more just and 
smooth functioning market, beyond the pitfalls of poverty and discouragement that, ac-
cording to  Standing, revolves from contemporary conditional social protection measures.!
A part of the academic debate surrounding UBI revolves around the perspective of human 
rights (Standing 1999; van Parijs 2001; Raventós 2007). Usually, the argument relates to a  
discussion and interpretation of the Declaration of Universal Human Rights, specifically 
the article 25.1, stating that: !
“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and neces-
sary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, dis-
ability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his con-
trol” (UN 1948).!
The unconditional and individual nature of UBI is also highlighted as a part of a feminist 
academic line of thought (Fitzpatrick 2000; van Parijs 2001; Millar 1996). The view is so, 
that decoupling paid labour from livelihood can ultimately lead to a weakening of the pa-
triarchal categorisations of work and labour, transforming the imperative to a more plural-
istic question of contributing, independent of labour demand and current labour arrange-
ment regimes. This is contrary to current welfare programmes, where the reciprocity of 
contributing to society is defined through economic measures, meaning that women often 
will come out as ‘less entitled’ per se, in a general means test (van Parijs 2001:75ff).  This 
contributes to the general gender segregation in labour, both vertically in terms of work-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16!This!theory!and!its!relation!to!the!concept!of!Basic!Income!is!thoroughly!described!in!The!Precariat:!The!New!DangeC
rous!Class!(Standing!2011)!and!A!Precariat!Charter!(Standing!2014).!
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fields and horizontally in terms of hierarchy, which ultimately leaves women with higher 
risk and longer durations of poverty compared with men (Millar 1996:52) and at the same 
time, makes them more dependent upon the welfare state (Fitzpatrick 2000:158). In this 
way, UBI as social policy can be seen as a part of a feminist struggle to break the alleged 
mutual reinforcement of the institutions of marriage, employment and citizenship (Pate-
man 2003:90). Recognising UBI as a right for every citizen individually, indiscriminate of 
gender, sexuality, religion or cohabitational arrangements can be seen as a way to counter 
some of the structural repression, that are institutionalised by welfare arrangements as for 
instance indirect payment for care or family-based tax benefits that positively discrimi-
nates a heteronormative family structure (Fitzpatrick 2000:158ff).!!
3.1.3 Defining Universal Basic Income 
This section will capture and summarises the presented views and research on UBI in or-
der to define the properties of the concept. !
● The concept of UBI is by design universal, understood as each and every member 
or accredited resident of a society is entitled to the benefit. What society here en-
tails is defined by the context where the UBI is discussed or sought to be applied, 
whether that is at village level, on state or national level, through supranational in-
stitution like EU or even as a universal human right (Raventos 2007:7ff).!
● The concept of UBI is unconditional. It is important, that entitlement to a basic in-
come is not subject to any means test or predetermined threshold of poverty, in or-
der to circumvent the poverty traps of usual workfare programmes (Standing 1999, 
2011, 2015; van Parijs 1996, 2001). Furthermore, it is non-selective insofar that it 
does not favour or penalise any particular form of cohabitation or livelihood (Stand-
ing 2011; Raventos 2007; van Parijs 1996).!
● The concept of UBI transfers cash grants in regular intervals and the amount is at 
least equal to a subsistence minimum. Defining this subsistence minimum is of 
course a relative matter, but it must be enough to sustain a respectable livelihood in 
order to ‘achieve real freedom for all’ (van Parijs 2001:15). !
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● The concept of UBI entails a grant distributed by the state or nation or an adequate 
politico-juridical body with the legitimacy and jurisdiction to govern (Raventós 
2007).!
Based on the above considerations, the following definition of Universal Basic Income will 
be applied throughout this project: !
Universal Basic Income is a scheme where each and every member or accredited resident 
of a society, irrespective of income, employment status or cohabitational arrangements is 
entitled to an unconditional payment from the state or nation, in regular intervals, that is 
at least equal to a subsistence minimum, to spend as they seem fit.!!
3.2 Neoliberalism 
The economic rationales behind neoliberalism are closely related to neoclassical economics 
(Stilwell 2012:207). It is thus necessary to introduce this relation and identify neoliberal-
ism as the existing development paradigm. To begin with, a brief historical account of neo-
classical- and neoliberal economic thinking is outlined to specify the project’s conceptual 
framework. Then, a set of core principles of neoliberalism is identified in order to state the 
analytical framework of the project.!!
3.2.1 The Relation Between Neoclassical Economics and Neoliberalism 
Neoclassical economic theory originated in the 1870s when scholars, such as William Stan-
ley Jevons17, Carl Menger18 and Leon Walras19 applied the more abstract reasoning of Da-
vid Ricardo20 and narrowed it to a “[…] formal analysis of individual economic behaviour 
and the functioning of markets” (Stilwell 2012:152). E. Roy Weintraub21 has articulated 
three central assumptions that define the shared neoclassical understanding:!
1. People have rational preferences among outcomes; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17!1935&1982:!British!economist!and!logician!
18!1840&1921:!Austrian!economist!
19!1834&1910:!French!mathematical!economist!
20!1772&1823:!British!poliitcal!economist!who!influenced!on!the!classical!economy!
21!1943&:!American!professor!of!Economics!at!Duke!University!
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2. Individuals maximise utility and firms maximise profits; 
3. People act independently on the basis of full and relevant information.  
(Weintraub 1993).!
These theories shifted the spotlight from previous concerns in the classical political econ-
omy about classes, interests and conditions of progress to the behaviour of individuals and 
markets. Walras was one of the economists that theorised about free markets, consumer 
choice and the stability of equilibrium – also known as general equilibrium theory - by 
showing the dense relation between changes in consumer purchasing patterns and changes 
in the prices of goods supplied in the market (Stilwell 2012:154). This theorisation was 
used to show the interdependence of markets and the prospect of a stable and pure market 
economy. Furthermore, the neoclassical analysis of the market economy also emphasised 
rationality, individual utility-maximisation, freedom of choice and efficient allocation of 
scarce economic resources. These beliefs about individual behaviour and the properties of 
markets were adopted in a more political context by neoliberalism: “Neoliberalism is to 
politics what neoclassicism is to economics” (ibid.:207).!
In the 1930s, Keynesian economics was introduced during the great depression, shifting 
focus from the neoclassical emphasis on the individual towards recognising the state as the 
focal point and most obvious institution to implement economic policy (Stilwell 
2012:264ff.). This view was accepted by the monetarist school of Milton Friedman22, laying 
the groundwork for neoliberal economic thinking. Friedman emphasized the role of the 
governments in control of the circulation of money. By the 1990s, Margaret Thatcher23 and 
Ronald Reagan24 had set the developmental path based on monetarist reforms promising 
greater quality and freedom, which came to be known as the ‘TINA principle’ (There Is No 
Alternative):!
“Where neoclassical theory had once been a dissenting school, and Keynesianism and 
structural economics the orthodoxy, in both academic and policy circles, neoclassical the-
ory was the new orthodoxy” (Greig et. al. 2007:103).!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22!1912&2006:!American!professor!of!Economics!at!University!of!Chicargo!
23!1925&2013:!Prime!Minister!of!the!United!Kingdom!from!1979&190!
24!1911&2004:!President!of!the!United!States!from!1981&1989!
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The principles of this new neoliberal development paradigm have by some scholars been 
explained as shifting explicit concerns with inequality to concerns with economic freedom 
and growth (Greig et. al. 2007:104; O’Brien & Williams 2013:232f). The economic dimen-
sion of neoliberal politics is often spoken of as ‘economic rationalism’ and ‘economic fun-
damentalism’. In practice, neoliberal policies have been related to:!
“Privatisation, deregulation, trade-liberalisation, reductions in the level and progressivi-
ty of income taxation, contracting out of public services, and the withdrawal of govern-
ments from their previous commitment to universal social security” (Stilwell 2012:208).!
This shift in policy has also been referred to as the ‘Washington Consensus’, as a specific 
set of neoliberal policy of structural adjustment promoted by institutions such as the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank and The US Treasury Department. 
These institutions have conducted policy based on macroeconomic stabilisation, promot-
ing foreign direct investment and expanding market forces within the domestic economy 
(O’Brian & Williams 2013:232).!
In the 1990s, global power elites incorporated globalisation with neoliberal ideas and ra-
tionales. Bill Clinton25 was convinced of the fact that a new economy of global scope was 
evolving, using the term market globalism to describe an economy driven by market forces 
(Steger & Roy 2010:51ff.). Tony Blair26 embraced this form of market globalism, introduc-
ing a government that forged a Third Way that could respond to the challenges of the new 
global economy (ibid.). This new wave of neoliberalism represented a commitment to-
wards; “[…] strengthening social solidarity without dropping the neoliberal ideal of mar-
ket-oriented entrepreneurship” (ibid.:50). Neoliberalism was then a political project that 
aimed at minimizing those forms of state intervention that are associated with the welfare 
state or socialist state. Nevertheless, neoliberalism involves and accepts intervention by the 
state as a form of developing governance that stimulates the market economy (Golubović & 
Golubović 2012:12). It is widely acknowledged that this political and economic framework 
has a dominant position within the current world order;!
!
 “[…] not only to its intellectual strength and empirical evidence, but also to (its) support 
from influential global institutions and powerful governments” (Greig et. al. 2007:107).!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25!1946&:!President!of!the!United!States!of!America!from!1993&2001!
26!1953&:!Prime!Minister!of!the!United!Kingdom!from!1997&2007!!
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This project adopts this understanding of neoliberalism as the existing development para-
digm in which UBI would need to fit into in order to be implementable.!
3.2.2 The Neoliberal View on the Individual and Structural Conditions 
This section will identify a set of core parameters within neoliberal economic thinking 
based on neoclassical economic principles. These principles are strictly selected by an ac-
ceptance of the normative vision of how to organise the economy and society in neoliberal 
theory and using it as a “plausible description of the important political and economic 
changes over the past three decades” (Golubović & Golubović 2012:11). The parameters 
will focus on the neoliberal ideas of freedom and rational choice on an individual level and 
the optimal role of the state and market on a structural level.!
3.2.2.1 Individual Freedom 
The strong focus on the individual and the opportunities of freedom is by Friedman adopt-
ed from classical liberalists (Steger & Roy 2010:5f). In Capitalism and Freedom (1962), 
Friedman defines liberalism as freedom: !
“As liberals, we take freedom of the individuals, or perhaps the family as our ultimate 
goal in judging social arrangement” (Friedman 2002:12).!
In the same context, Friedman argues that the economic aspects of freedom are the most 
essential. The importance of economic freedom is justified by being a prerequisite of other 
aspects of freedom, especially political freedom (ibid.:8). Economic freedom is the ability 
of an individual to undertake economic direction and actions. The core of economic free-
dom is the freedom to choose how to spend one’s income, including the decision of what 
goods and services to buy, when to save, what to give a way and to whom (Friedman & 
Friedman 1980:65f). Thus, Friedman agitates for policy prescriptions of less taxation, less 
regulation and less intervention because state regulation limits the personal economic 
freedom – and thereby individual freedom. On top of this founding argument, Friedman 
describes two important aspects of economic freedom. First, economic freedom is a ques-
tion of values: “(ed. Freedom is to) (…) use the resources we process in accordance with 
our own values” (ibid.:66). Every time the opportunities to spend income, in accordance to 
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one’s values, are limited, it interferes with the individual freedom. Secondly, economic 
freedom is the right to own private property. This can enable people to achieve greater per-
sonal freedom by reducing uncertainty and encouraging investments (ibid.:67). 
Freedom can never be entirely absolute. In a society, an individual will have to accept the 
interdependence of people, yet never feel restricted by conditions of how to use freedom: 
“We do live in an interdependent society. Some restrictions on our freedom are necessary 
to avoid other, still worse, restrictions” (Friedman & Friedman 1980:69).!
Parameter 1: In order for Universal Basic Income to be compatible with the existing ne-
oliberal development paradigm, it has to ensure people economic freedom, without any 
avoidable governmental restrictions.!
3.2.2.2 Rational Choice 
The theory of rational choice – or the assumption of maximizing utility – is by many 
viewed as the paradigmatic core of neoclassical economics (Vanberg 1993:171). Rational 
choice theory was first introduced by Oskar Morgenstern27 and John von Neumann28 in 
Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (1944). It has been the core of behavioural 
economic thinking within many economic schools and thus found in many nuances. More-
over, most mainstream economic models and theories are based on rational choice theory 
(Nielsen & Høgenhaven 2009:15f). In the neoliberal school, economists and theorists at 
Chicago School of Economics have applied and discussed the term including Gary Beck-
er29, Friedman and Robert E. Lucas30. !
Rational choice is an economic principle used for understanding and modelling individual 
social and economic behaviour. It is defined as:!
“[…] the process of determining what options are available and then choosing the most 
preferred one according to some consistent criterion” (Levin & Milgrom 2004:1).!
This definition is based on the assumption that all individuals make intelligent and logical 
choices that provide them with the result of their highest self-interest (O’Brien & Williams 
2013:28f). In general, people will choose the decision that provides them with maximum !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27!1902&1977:!German!economist!
28!1903&1957:!Hungarian,!later!American!mathematician!
29!1930&2014:!American!Professor!of!Economy!and!Sociology!at!University!of!Chicago!
30!1937&:!American!economist!at!University!of!Chicago!
! 30!
benefits and minimum costs. The individual is thus, in order to fulfil quantifiable meas-
urement criterions, viewed as egocentric and own-utility maximising. Moreover, the model 
of rational decision-making does not include factors that cannot be quantified, such as loy-
alties, personal feelings or the sense of obligation (Vanberg 1993:172ff).!
This economic approach of the neoclassical school, including its view on methodological 
individualism and self-interest assumptions, have been criticised for being simplistic and 
reductionist (ibid.:175). Yet, this project delimits from this debate and focuses on the core 
assumptions of the rational actor model.!
Parameter 2: In order for Universal Basic Income to be compatible with the existing ne-
oliberal development paradigm, it has to promote individuals to act rational in accordance 
with the assumption of own-utility maximisation.!
3.2.2.3 The Optimal Role of the Market 
The market is the central institution or instrument of organising modern societies within 
neoliberalism. Economic policies at national and international level should not be focused 
at facilitating the functioning of free markets. Nevertheless, neoliberalism accepts the fact 
that; “(t)he market exists and exists only in specific political, legal and institutional condi-
tions that have been build by the state” (Golubović & Golubović 2012:4). In general, ne-
oliberal policies prioritise market principles over state interference. In order to theorise 
the optimal role of the market, the neoclassical view of the general equilibrium and wel-
fare economics is to be presented.!
In neoclassical economics the general equilibrium theory is used to evaluate the working 
of the economy (Stilwell 2012:200). León Walras31 introduced32 the basic theoretical as-
sumption that general equilibrium exists; “[…] when a set of prices for goods and factors 
of production equates supply and demand in all markets simultaneously” (ibid.:201). 
There are constantly some forces destined to cause disequilibrium, which is why markets 
in reality will never achieve the perfect state of equilibrium. The state is viewed upon as a 
general disequilibrium that disturbs the market process towards restoring general equilib-
rium through regulation. This notion that “a network of interdependent markets produce !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31!1834&1910:!French!mathematical!economist!
32!Elements!of!Pure!Economics!(1874)!
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overall stability” is eloquent with the neoclassical view of the supreme role of the market 
and the distressing role of the state. Neoliberalism adopts this normative theoretical posi-
tion, though accepting the premise that the state serves its necessary role within the econ-
omy (ibid.:207ff).!
Neoliberalism recognises that the theoretical idea of an allocative market is in practice not 
completely realisable. In policy-making, externalities, market imperfections and incom-
plete or even missing markets are taken into account in an overall recognition of market 
failures (Thirlwall 2006:289). This recognition of market failures provides an incentive for 
neoliberalism to develop “appropriate government policies” (Stilwell 2012:205). In that 
way, an acceptance of the state to rein market failures, in order to provide possibilities for 
market equilibria, is present in existing neoliberalism.!
A general equilibrium is not necessarily the optimum situation since the process towards 
adjustment to new equilibria can have socially adverse features such as highly unequal dis-
tribution of income (ibid.:203). Critics will argue that this adverse features is a result of a 
trickle-down strategy, where the idea that wealth, e.g. money, trickles down throughout 
society from the upper layers, results in unequal distribution of wealth (Thirlwall 
2006:239). Vilfredo Pareto33, whom neoliberalism draws upon, agitates that a redistribu-
tion of income only can be considered an improvement; “[...] if it makes some person (ed. 
or people) better off without making anyone worse off” (Stilwell 2012:202). The logic 
supports the claim that if the rich get richer and the poor stay poor then the society as a 
whole experiences a net gain. The growth of wealth and thereby welfare should thus be 
achieved through;!
“[…] the release of individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
environment that is characterized by clearly defined and protected property rights, free 
markets and free trade” (Golubović & Golubović 2012:5).!
Individuals should have ‘the freedom to choose’ their preferences and achieve economic 
welfare through the market.!
Parameter 3: In order for Universal Basic Income to be compatible with the existing ne-
oliberal development paradigm, it has to accept the notion that the market generally cre-
ates equilibrium, but that the state must have a role in reining market failures.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33!1848&1923:!Italian!engineer,!sociologist,!economist,!political!scientist!and!philosopher!
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3.2.2.4 The Optimal Role of the State 
In neoliberalism, the role of the state or government is to promote and maintain an institu-
tional framework that supports the market. In this sense, existing neoliberalism; “[…] in-
volves a strong state serving capitalist interests, not a withdrawal of the state from the 
economy” (Stilwell 2012:208). The state must ensure “territorial integrity, internal peace 
and order, law enforcement and the smooth functioning of the market” (Golubović & 
Golubović 2012:5).  If a market does not exist, e.g. on areas of education, healthcare or so-
cial services, then the state must help create a market. In general, all neoliberal policy-
making must reinforce “the desired goal of an efficient market economy” (Stilwell 
2012:207). Besides this, state intervention must be minimised since the state does not have 
adequate information, and is easily affected by interest groups (Harvey 2005:2). !
In practice of state behaviour, New Public Management (NPM) and underlying assump-
tions behind it has been the prevailing neoliberal reform-tendency for the last quarter of a 
century. It has been described as followed:!
“Operationalizing the neoliberal mode of governance for public servants, it redefined citi-
zens as ‘customers’ or ‘clients’ and encouraged administrators to cultivate an ‘entrepre-
neurial spirit’” (Steger & Roy 2010:13).!
This approach to the public sector is based on the same neoclassical understanding of state 
and economy, and is characterised:!
 “[…] lessening or removing differences between the public and the private sector and 
shifting the emphasis from process accountability towards a greater element of account-
ability in terms of results” (Hood 1995:94). !
The goal is thus to streamline the public sector, which includes minimising bureaucratic 
processes within the public sector in order to ensure increased efficiency and productivity 
(ibid.:95). The project applies the rationales behind NPM since it is acknowledged as the 
model of public administration that has been prevalent in the neoliberal paradigmatic era 
and thus used as operationalising for this specific mode of governance.!
Parameter 4: In order for Universal Basic Income to be compatible with the neoliberal 
development paradigm, it has to promote the state to serve a minimal role in supporting 
and expanding the market, as well as minimising state bureaucracy in order to ensure in-
creased productivity and efficiency.  
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4 Universal Basic In-
come Pilot Projects 
in Madhya Pradesh, 
India 
In the following chapter, the two UBI pilot projects 
in Madhya Pradesh will be reviewed. The corpora-
tion between organisations, the methodological se-
lection of villages and the extent of the pilots will be 
explained. Lastly, the key results of the project will 
be outlined to provide an overview towards the 
analysis.!!!!!!
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4 Universal Basic Income Pilot Projects in Madhya  
Pradesh, India 
4.1 Review of the Indian Pilots 
The UBI pilot schemes in India were launched in the rural areas of Madhya Pradesh in 
2010 by the NGO, Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), in a partnership with 
UNICEF (Standing 2013:1). It was intended to observe potential conditions for scaling up 
the policy to state or national level. The essential idea of the pilot project was to provide 
more than 6,000 individuals with a small unconditional monthly payment for at least a 
year. The pilots were monitored before, during and after the individuals received the 
grants, then evaluated through three rounds of statistical surveys and through case studies. 
Moreover, the results were compared with a ‘control group’ that, in the same period, did 
not receive grants. The two pilots were performed in the period between June 2011 to No-
vember 2012 and were conducted as follows (Davala et. al. 2015:31ff.):!
1. The Madhya Pradesh Unconditional Cash Transfer pilot (MPUCT) was completed 
in eight villages consisting of 938 households and 5,547 individuals with all resi-
dents being provided with monthly grants of Indian Rupees (Rs.) 200/30034 per 
adult and Rs. 100/15035 per child for 16 months (first eleven months/last five 
months)36. The evaluation was compared to 12 control villages consisting of 1,096 
households and 5,684 individuals that did not receive monthly grants. 
2. The Tribal Village Unconditional Cash Transfer pilot (TVUCT) was completed in 
one tribal village consisting of 127 households and 756 individuals with all residents 
being provided with monthly grants of Rs. 300 per adult and Rs. 150 per child for 12 
months. The evaluation was compared to one control village consisting of 97 house-
holds and 817 individuals that did not receive monthly grants. 
The pilots were designed to identify the direct and indirect effects of UBI grants on indi-
vidual and family behaviour and attitudes, as well as general community development. In 
the case of MPUCT, the method of modified randomized control trial was practiced (Da-
vala et. al. 2015:34f). This method was applied with the intention of making sure that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34!Approximately!3/5!US!Dollars!
35!Approximately!1,5/2,5!US!Dollars!
36!This!amount!equates!to!approximately!20&30!%!of!the!monthly!income!of!a!poor!family’s!income.!!
! 35!
results, recorded in the eight villages, were comparable to the similar villages and house-
holds that acted as control villages. It meant randomly selecting a set of villages with as 
similar conditions as possible. This approach was reviewed in workshops beforehand, at 
which independent specialists participated and assisted the decision of applying it. The 
villages were selected from the Indore District in Madhya Pradesh and were all roughly 
similar in size in order to fulfil the requirement of randomly choosing from a hub of villag-
es with similar socio-economic structures and distance to the city Indore. In the case of 
TVUCT, one village was randomly selected from a list of a senior official of the Madhya 
Pradesh government. Then, another tribal village with similar structural features was also 
randomly selected as control village. !
This project does not distinguish between the two pilots since the purpose is to use the 
empirical data as a general exemplification of the effects of UBI, not to make specific con-
clusions on the case of Madhya Pradesh in India.!
4.2 Key Findings 
Based on the statistic material that was gathered throughout the duration of the pilot pro-
jects, several conclusions were made on the basis of the evaluation surveys that were car-
ried out prior to, during and upon the finalisation of the pilots. These conclusions are 
briefly presented in this section by subgroups, and are categorised as follows:!
● In terms of implementation and financial inclusion, when given the choice between 
UBI and existing food subsidy programmes and other benefits, the scheme was ac-
cepted and received by a vast majority of eligible villagers and most of them opened 
up a bank account. Savings increased and households began using their bank ac-
counts for savings and the like (UNICEF 2014:40, Standing 2013:4; Davala et. al. 
2015:64f). !
● In terms of housing and sanitation, UBI recipients were more likely to make im-
provements to their dwellings, thereby increasing the quality of their housing. The 
cash grants were also used to switch to more preferred sources of energy, and in the 
tribal village, grants led to construction of new dwellings and improvements to 
drinking water sources and shift to better lighting (Standing 2013:4; Davala et. al. 
2015:71ff.).!
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● In terms of nutrition and diet, UBI recipients experienced a significant increase in 
food sufficiency (UNICEF 2014:14). An improved quality of the food and more var-
ied diets led to an increase in children’s weight for age (Standing 2013:4f; Davala et. 
al. 2015:97). An improvement in access to clean drinking water was also noted 
(UNICEF 2014:13).!
● In terms of health and healthcare, UBI lowered the number of reported instances of 
common illnesses and increased spending on medical treatment. An overall positive 
effect on the general health condition of the recipients were accredited to UBI as 
well. The project also saw a rise in families acquiring health insurance and in the 
use of private health clinics (Standing 2013:5; Davala et. al. 2015:113). !
● In terms of impact on the disabled, UBI enabled disabled individuals to have better 
access to food and medical equipment. Furthermore, it granted the disabled a great-
er voice in how money was spent, and some became economically active, thus em-
powering themselves and assisting them in becoming more independent of help 
from others (Standing 2013:5; Davala et. al. 2015:182f). !
● In terms of schooling, UBI had an effect on the quality of schooling for enrolled 
children. The grants also seemed to have an effect on the performance of enrolled 
children, as a tendency to perform better could be spotted amongst the children 
coming from cash grant families compared to others (Standing 2013:5f; Davala et. 
al. 2015:134ff). These tendencies were especially noticeable amongst girls (UNICEF 
2014:17).!
● In terms of economic activity, work and production, UBI increased the amount of 
labour and work among the recipients. The grants led to a rise in production as well 
as in own-account work. It was also observed that a switch from wage labour to 
own-account farming and small-scale business could be attributed to the cash 
grants. Moreover, an increase in the number of livestock was observed (Standing 
2013:6; Davala et. al. 2015:154f). !
● In terms of debt and savings, UBI helped recipients pay off old debt, and avoid get-
ting new debt. The grants furthermore provided means for savings and an increase 
in savings was observed (Standing 2013:6).!
! !
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5 Universal Basic  
Income, the Pilots 
and Neoliberalism 
In detecting the compatibility of parameter 1 and 2, 
the project analyses the neoliberal framework of 
individual behaviour in relation to the empirical da-
ta of the two UBI pilots from Madhya Pradesh. As 
showcased in the theoretical chapter, the individual 
behaviour of recipients of UBI would need to comply 
with the theoretical assumptions of individual free-
dom and rational choice in order to fulfil these pa-
rameters. This chapter will thereby answer the fol-
lowing question:!
What effect did Universal Basic Income have on the 
individual behaviour of recipients in Madhya Pra-
desh, India?!
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5 Universal Basic Income, the Pilots and Neoliberalism 
5.1 Individual Freedom and Universal Basic Income 
This section will examine whether the effects of the UBI scheme on an individual level 
supported the neoliberal conception of the individual freedom. Freedom is in neoliberal-
ism a necessity for an individual to be able to pursue one’s rational aspiration. On the basis 
of parameter 1, this section will investigate whether UBI provides people with individual 
freedom, and if this is possible without any governmental restrictions.!
The individuals that received UBI in the pilots were not limited by any requirements - 
making it an unconditional transfer of money. This notion is encouraged by the assump-
tion that receivers of UBI spend their money freely for their own benefits (Standing 
2012:64). In theorem, UBI does seem to provide recipients with the freedom of choice by 
being unconditional. The ability to choose freely in regards to all economic matters in life 
can enable other kinds of freedoms, such as political freedom etc. (cf. 3.2.2.1.). If this is the 
premise, UBI can potentially serve as emancipatory and empowering by providing eco-
nomic freedom and independence to individuals. The pilots show a clear tendency that 
UBI have an impact on how recipients deal with the issue of financial debt. By having debt, 
people are forced to enter into debt bondage37 paying their debt off by working directly for 
the moneylenders, which limits their possibilities of shifting away from economic despair, 
and maintains their current economic and social position (Davala et. al. 2015:57). In this 
sense, debt may be categorised as a loss of economic freedom. The pilots show that 12.5 % 
of the individuals receiving UBI spent their money on reducing debt, in comparison to only 
5 % in the control villages (ibid.:54). Moreover, due to the economic security that UBI 
seemingly brings, recipients were able to avoid taking further debt (Perkiö 2014:8, Davala 
et. al. 2015:54f). Considering this, the grants provided by the pilots enabled a higher level 
of economic independence for the recipients by enabling them to pay off their debts. This 
economic independence also seems to enable people to choose freely and make conscious 
decisions about taking loans or making investments. The pilots show that people receiving 
UBI were more likely to borrow money for the sake of making savings or investments in 
livestock, instead of borrowing out of necessity (Davala et. al. 2015:64, 148). In the end, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 This form of debt bondage is in an Indian context named naukar. Naukar is when people ‘freely choose’ to 
work off their debt on a daily basis (Davala et. al. 2015:57)!
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these healthier loans can possibly have the potential of providing a higher degree of eco-
nomic freedom.!
The empirical data also show that UBI seems to promote the possibility of making deci-
sions based on individual values. In the pilots, 60 % of the recipients had mainly saved up 
money for security reasons, by pooling income, in order to counter life-cycle hazards such 
as expenditures for weddings, funerals and childbirth (ibid.:66). This could exemplify that 
receiving a basic income means having the option to make value-laden decisions. Moreo-
ver, the decision is even taken without one being forced into debt: “(W)ithout the basic 
income money, the options would have been to incur a debt […]” (ibid.:66). It may so be 
derived that the gained economic freedom gives the recipients the possibility of making 
value-laden economic decisions without being indebted. As mentioned earlier, having a 
debt also deprives and reduces individual economic freedom.!
Being economically independent and able to choose freely can also have a direct effect on 
matters that can be defined as social freedom. This sphere of freedom covers the degree of 
individual freedom in social structures and matters, but does not by definition take cultur-
al aspects into account by distinguishing between whom freedom is enhanced for.!
In the pilots, this enhanced social freedom can be analysed in regards to family and gender 
issues. An example of a shift in behaviour seemingly subject to the UBI is in relation to 54 
% of women from the Indian pilots noting they shared earnings equally compared to 39 % 
in the control group (UNICEF 2014:100). When added to the observation, that women’s 
labour participation rose 16 % during the pilots, it appears as if women became empow-
ered through the economic freedom provided by the UBI grants. Moreover, the data of the 
pilots showed a decrease of nearly 20 %38 in recipients citing that; “everyday economic 
decisions were made solely by the household head” (Davala et. al. 2015:172). This indi-
cates that not only social freedom is generated, but receiving UBI seems to also have pro-
moted social equality by diversifying the gender roles within a household, thus potentially 
enabling individuals, in this case women, a form of economic citizenship. This citizenship 
is awarded by the renewed economic freedom in regards to choosing, for instance, what to 
buy and where to buy it (ibid.:179). As mentioned, the theory of freedom does not distin-
guish between genders, but has a focus on enhanced opportunities and freedom in general. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 From 71 % before UBI  to 52 % after!
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When freedom is enhanced for individuals, regardless of gender, neoliberalism perceives it 
is a positive thing. As such the empowering of women can indeed be placed in the category 
of social freedom.!
Overall, concerning the presence of individual freedom, it is important to note that the in-
dividual still have to navigate within a framework of complex taxes, tariffs and other regu-
lations, set up by the state or government. Their freedom is thus never entirely absolute 
(cf. 3.2.2.1.). UBI seems to enable individual freedom, yet does not remove the impact of 
restrictions enforced by the government. In general, UBI in India, and especially the fact 
that it is unconditional, has made recipients more free by giving them the economic re-
sources to act as they please. In this perspective, the fact that the government is the admin-
istrator of the income distribution creates a dependency between the individual and state. 
As argued, this dependency can function emancipatorily for the individual. Nonetheless, 
neoliberalism would not, in theorem, accept the notion that UBI promotes a lasting de-
pendency between the individual and the state.!
5.2 Rational Choice and Universal Basic Income 
In order for UBI to be compatible with the existing neoliberal development paradigm, the 
two UBI pilots from Madhya Pradesh have to fulfil parameter 2 by promoting individuals 
to act rational within the economic behavioural sphere.!
In this analysis, the term rationality is strictly confined to cover how individuals act. The 
analytical scope of this chapter is thus predetermined by the theoretical assumption that 
actors conducting rational choices are defined as individuals rather than as interpersonal 
affiliations such as households or communities (cf. 3.2.2.2.). A central neoliberal argument 
is that individual freedom is a necessity for a person to act rational within the rational ac-
tor model. This section will thus investigate whether the individuals that received a UBI in 
India utilised their individual freedom to act rational. One of the primary critiques of UBI 
is that unconditional cash transfers induce dependency and laziness (Drèze 2011). This 
applies the notion that individuals act irrational in individual economic endeavours, and 
that they are thus not seeking the optimum of own-utility maximisation.!
Concerning work, productivity and growth, the empirical evidence from the pilots shows 
that; “[…] there was an increase in economic activity and thus a beneficial effect on eco-
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nomic growth and incomes” (Davala et. al. 2015:154). Amongst households with an in-
crease in activities related to income earning, 73.4 % cited that this increase was attributed 
to the payment of UBI. The renewed economic liquidity provided by the UBI seems also to 
have nourished investments, noting increased purchase of seeds, fertilisers, and other raw 
materials along with productive assets39 (ibid.:139). This finding may be interpreted as ra-
tional decision-making based on the assumption that individuals make intelligent and log-
ical choices resulting in the most optimal economic outcome. Since there was a tendency 
for people receiving UBI to strive towards an increase in income-earning activities, it can 
be deduced that individuals act rationally in terms of economic behaviour as an exemplifi-
cation of own-utility maximisation. These investments in productive assets seems also to 
have generated returns, insofar as 22 % of the UBI household cited an increase in house-
hold income, grant excluded (UNICEF 2014:181f)40.  Taking the above-mentioned into ac-
count, the grant of UBI seemingly encourages an increase in economic activities in the vil-
lages participating in the pilots.!
In relation to the increase in economic activity, the pilots also promoted a shift from casual 
wage labour to own-account work. The share doing casual wage labour as their main ac-
tivity fell from 55 % to 27 %, whilst the proportion of individuals reporting own-account 
farming as their main activity rose from 40 % to 62 % (Davala et. al. 2015:145f). This shift 
can be attributed to their documented increase in ability to invest in fertiliser, seeds, irriga-
tion and livestock. Investments in productive assets have a potential for creating a circle of 
positive reinforcement by inducing liquidity through returns thereby fostering new in-
vestments etc. Furthermore, the transformation from casual wage labour to own-account 
labour can be seen as an example where individuals determine a decision by quantifiably 
assessing opportunities and choosing the option that provides them with maximum bene-
fits and minimum costs. Casual wage labour is often recognised as being both more inse-
cure, as these jobs are often seasonal, and less favourable in terms of autonomy, independ-
ence and an economically sustainable livelihood (ibid.146). Additionally, own-account 
work entails a high degree of flexibility since recipients are now in charge of their own 
working hours and thus independent from employers. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39!e.g.!41!new!wells!were!dug!in!the!Basic!Income!villages!subject!to!4!prior!to!the!pilot,!45!%!increase!in!the!number!
of!electrical!pumps!for!agricultural!irrigation!and!an!48!%!(57!units)!increase!in!the!number!of!ploughs!bought!(Davala!
et.!al.!2015:149&150),!the!share!of!families!owning!large!livestock!increased!from!66!%!to!81!%,!the!share!of!families!
owning!small!livestock!increased!from!62!%!to!78!%!(Davala!et.!al.!2015:148).!
40!Compared!to!a!10!%!increase!in!households!citing!an!increase!in!income!in!the!control!villages.!!
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In making this decision, the calculation of costs and benefits leads to own-account labour, 
since there have been invested in expansion of livestock, seeds etc., it can be assumed that 
the need for labour force equally increased. If a person is able to gain the maximum benefit 
from small-scale production and/or the provision of goods and services rather than being 
dependent on casual wage-labour, the person will, in theorem, rationally choose to shift 
into own-account work. Nonetheless, making a rational decision does not always equal not 
making a bad choice (Standing 2012:71). People will arguably never reach a state of full 
information, where they are able to make the, in theorem perfect rational choice. An actor 
will always choose the most preferable option when making a decision, based on the extent 
of possessed information, costs and benefits and own-utility maximisation. Johanna 
Perkiö41, commenting on the Indian pilots, adds that despite the possibility of making a 
bad choice; “(t)hose receiving cash grants were not more likely than others to increase 
their spending on “private bads” such as alcohol or tobacco” (Perkiö 2014:7). Based on 
this observation, it does not indicate that UBI causally increase occurrences of ‘bad deci-
sions’ or at least not in this case. Perikös comment supports the notion that receiving UBI 
promotes individuals to act rational, rather than irrational.!
In relation to the impact of UBI on nutrition, the empirical data show that; “(f)ood defi-
ciency fell, diets became more nutritious and balanced […]” (Davala et. al. 2015:97). The 
consumption of more nutritious foods such as pulses and lentils rose by over 1,000 % 
(from 0.3 kilos to 3.3 kilos per family) and fresh vegetables rose by 888 % (from 0.6 kilos 
to 5.5 kilos per family). Moreover, the consumption of meats, fish and eggs also rose nota-
bly (ibid.:90), and the amount respondents citing that their income was sufficient to meet 
their nutritional need rose with 32 % (UNICEF 2014:71). This outcome similarly corre-
sponds with the theoretical framework of rational choice in terms of choosing a logical and 
intelligent decision. The decision of eating more nutritious can be characterised as ration-
al, as quality of food has a direct correlation with good health and resilience towards ill-
nesses. As sickness is an expenditure, it is logical to try to reduce this by improving food 
quality and quantity.!
Despite the fact that the choices of individuals in the UBI pilots can be characterised as 
rational decision-making, it can be disputed whether the empirical data aligns with the 
theoretical principle that rational choice excludes loyalties, personal feelings and/or the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Finnish Doctoral Researcher at The University of Tampere!
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sense of obligation.  Figure 5.1 shows the weight-for-age distribution of children up to the 
age of 5 years in UBI villages by gender (Davala et. al. 2015:94). This graph shows that the 
share of girls with normal weight increased by over 25 percentage points, whilst the share 
of boys rose by 14 percentage points. This indicates that the UBI pilots have resulted in an 
increased consumption of nutritious food, clearly affecting children’s weight, as the distri-
bution moves towards the WHO standards. In this lies a paradox that consists of whether 
the decision to acquire foods that are more nutritious is egocentric and based on own utili-
ty-maximising or is a choice to better the life of one’s children due to personal feelings or 
the sense of obligation. Yet, the rational actor model excludes factors that are non-
quantifiable, thus not including family-related factors in the process of determining a deci-
sion.!
!
Even though the analysis of the empirical data of the pilots seem to indicate that individu-
als act rational in their economic behaviour, it may be questioned if non-quantifiable fac-
tors influence this decision-making. This can be exemplified by the shift in tendency from 
children doing wage labour to own-account farm work. During the period of the pilot, 26 % 
of the families with children doing wage labour reported that the children either stopped 
working or shifted to own-account farm work (Davala et. al. 2015:142). This decision can 
be argued to have been influenced by non-quantifiable factors. The fact is that the empiri-
cal data shows that a shift by children to own-account labour also leads to a positive spill 
over effect on school attendance, as this kind of work is more complementary with school-
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ing or at least potentially so (ibid.). In general, the rational actor model would explain this 
decision from an individual assessment favouring own-account labour, where the decision 
of having the child help out at home seemed more beneficial. Firstly, as previous sections 
of the analysis showed, a tendency for adults to shift from wage to own account labour and 
utilise their renewed liquidity to invest in their production, which could call for a demand 
in labour. Secondly, children could also be seen as a social insurance for their parents, why 
it makes good sense to prioritise education over work, under the logical assumption that 
more time for education could result in more knowledge, a better job and thus a higher 
salary to ensure one’s parents. It is clear that rational choice would argue that parents de-
cide based on their own utility maximisation, yet non-quantifiable factors must cannot en-
tirely be ruled out. In making this decision, the influence of the parent’s feelings towards 
their child and his/her future could and would most likely in part influence this decision. 
Based on this analysis, it may be argued that actions can be rational in both/or either in a 
long and short time perspective, as well as it is difficult to rule out non-quantifiable factors 
in determining decisions made by individuals. The project will not further deal with these 
arguments, only point to the fact that the squared rational actor model based on full and 
relevant information has its limitations.!
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
Through an analysis of the empirical data from the two pilots in India, the project has in-
vestigated whether UBI was compatible with the individualistic neoliberal framework of 
freedom and rational choice. It can be concluded that recipients of UBI gained economic 
freedom and generally acted rational in their decision-making. The investigation shows 
that UBI has had an emancipating and empowering function that ensured the economic 
independence of individuals, providing them with the freedom to choose utilisation of the 
money. However, this freedom is practiced within a consistent framework of governmental 
restrictions. Through this analysis it can be interpreted, that recipients had a general ten-
dency to act rational in their economic behaviour, yet it was not possible to deny the possi-
bility that actors could make ‘bad choices’ despite acting rational due to lack of information 
and/or from the potential influence of non-quantifiable factors such as personal feeling 
and obligation. To sum up, UBI seemed to affect the participants of the pilots to have a 
higher degree of individual freedom, which opened up for the possibility to act rational. 
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These concluding remarks confirm the first two individualistic analytical parameters of the 
project, thus settling that UBI, solely based on these parameters, is compatible within the 
existing neoliberal paradigm.!  
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6 Neoliberal Struc-
ture and Universal 
Basic Income 
In detecting the compatibility of parameter 3 and 4, 
the project analyses the structural framework of ne-
oliberalism in relation to the theoretical assumptions 
inherent to the concept of UBI contextualised with 
examples from the pilots. As showcased in the theo-
retical chapter, conceptual framework of Universal 
Basic Income would need to comply with the neolib-
eral conception that the market creates general equi-
librium and state interference should be kept to a 
minimum in order to fulfil these parameters. This 
chapter will thereby answer the following question: 
How does Universal Basic Income comply with the 
neoliberal conception of the optimum state-market 
relation on a structural level?!
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6 Neoliberal Structure and Universal Basic Income 
6.1 General Equilibrium 
In neoclassical economics, which neoliberalism draws upon, the general equilibrium theo-
ry is a key explanatory factor in understanding the optimal role of the market. The basic 
principle of this theory is that the market has the function of regulating supply and de-
mand, independent from the state. Any kind of direct intervention from the state is viewed 
as negative, as it causes disequilibrium (cf. 3.2.2.3.). This neoclassical distinction between 
the roles of the market and the state is not consistent with the approach in UBI. In UBI, 
the state is the central economic regulator, and has a catalysing role by distributing money 
directly to the individuals. On top of that, the fundamental idea of UBI is to regulate in-
come distribution, which, from this neoclassical point of view, would mean that UBI pro-
vokes disequilibrium.!
It can be reasoned that the general level of consumption increases for individuals receiving 
a basic income. To illustrate this with an empirical example, results from the Indian pilots 
can be applied. In Madhya Pradesh, the expenditure on schooling, eg. school items, in-
creased to be about 43 % higher in the UBI villages than in the control villages42 (Davala et. 
al. 2015:119). The overall demand for services increased for recipients of UBI, which can be 
seen in a 30 % improvement of school attendance in the UBI villages43 (ibid.:126). Accept-
ing the general equilibrium theory, this increase in demand will engender a similar in-
crease in supply from the market (Stilwell 2012:201). !
The previous analysis indicated that receiving a basic income created a relatively substan-
tial increase in opportunities for the recipients, which resulted in a variety of outcomes of 
own-utility maximising kind, that can be attributed to freely and rational spending and 
investment of the benefit. However, it can be argued that a UBI, being universal and 
providing equal grants to all, would cause higher gains in the hands of the poorest, as the 
amount represents a relatively bigger increase to their household budget. This claim is 
supported by the results of the Indian UBI pilots, noting almost a 7 percent point upwards 
movement from the lowest wealth quintile between the baseline study and the final evalua-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Another example can be increased medical spending (Davala et. al. 2015:111)!
43 Enhancement in the use of private hospitals can further underline the point (ibid.:107).!
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tion, whereas the richest two quintiles experienced very little transition (UNICEF 2014:61). 
Keeping this figure in mind, it appears so that UBI, when employed in a developmental 
context, does provide benefits for all, but with asymmetrical gains for different income 
groups, with the most significant positive impact on the poorest individuals of a society. !
As UBI can be a significant contributor of income directly to individuals coincide with the 
traditional neoliberal belief in general equilibrium. Here the market acts as the facilitator 
of economic growth, providing individuals with the possibilities to improve their own liv-
ing conditions. In UBI, the state - not the market - is the significant regulator, encouraging 
individuals to increase demand by boosting the liquidity of the recipients. In theorem, an 
increased demand should inevitably be followed by a surge in supply to meet the escalated 
demand level. From a neoliberal perspective it could be argued that the added liquidity 
provided by UBI could potentially cause a temporary ‘shock’ on the economy, whereafter 
prices would return to a ‘new normal’ as the market adapts and advances towards a general 
equilibrium caused by market mechanisms. On the basis of the abovementioned analysis, 
it can be drawn that UBI does not, in fact, cause or assist in realisation of a general equilib-
rium of the market. The shock on the economy, that a sudden inflow of cash originating 
from UBI would cause, could contradictorily be characterised as a mechanism that causes 
disequilibrium, which should be halted and reversed towards equilibrium by the market 
itself. !
6.2 The Neoliberal Conception of the Market  
Neoliberalism, when applied through a policy strategy, has to adjust to the contextual real-
ity that surrounds it (cf. 3.2.1.). In doing so, the full and complete acceptance of the neo-
classical theoretical assumptions must be adjusted to be compatible with reality. A signifi-
cant moderation attributed to this shift is the recognition of market failures (cf. 3.2.2.3.). 
The existence of market failures renders complete equilibrium impossible, which is why a 
certain degree of state intervention is accepted, given the fact that it is for the purpose of 
terminating market failures. This does not mean that the existing, moderated neoliberal-
ism renounces the idea of limiting the state. Existing neoliberalism clearly advocates for 
minimising state intervention. The neoliberal advocacy for minimising the state can be 
exemplified through their stance on the bureaucracy of a state apparatus, which they see as 
a sector that should be streamlined.!
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The neoliberal state is also compelled to nurture the entrepreneurial spirit within its juris-
diction in order for individuals to grasp the new economic opportunities presented (cf. 
3.2.2.4.). This is done mainly through de-bureaucratising allegedly disincentive limits and 
restrictions on investments. However, it can be argued that the entrepreneurial spirit is 
also promoted by UBI, as it distributes the liquidity necessary for the poor to make small-
scale investments. As shown in previous analysis, the UBI encourage rational economic 
agency on basis of the provided grants and which seems to lead to subsequent investments 
in productive assets (cf. 5.2.).!
A significant feature or characteristic of neoliberalism is the combination of its ideological 
preference for the market with a focus on economic growth (O’Brian & Williams 2013:219). 
In general, neoliberal scholars do not entirely agree on how to distribute the benefits of a 
society: “[...] (T)he problems of identifying consistent welfare criteria and compensation 
principles usually lead to a laissez-faire response” (Stilwell 2012:203). This uncertainty 
tends to end with the conclusion that it is best to let the allocation of resources be facilitat-
ed by the market. Yet, it does not matter if some groups in a society stay at an economic 
status quo, as long as other members of the societal structure achieve growth or economic 
gains (Cf. 3.2.2.3.). This traditional neoliberal argument implies a reasoning towards a 
trickle-down economy, where the premise is that economic prosperity by time will trickle 
down throughout society (Thirlwall 2006:239). In this view, acquiring economic growth 
does not have to prevent inequality from occurring, as the acquired wealth will automati-
cally spread downwards through society.!
When examining the underlying intentions of UBI in this perspective, it is clearly not com-
patible with the neoliberal way of accepting a degree of inequality. In fact, it does the oppo-
site, as a focal point for UBI is to counter inequality (cf. 3.1.2.). From the results of the pi-
lots, the economic effects of UBI can be viewed as kind of a trickle-up approach to social 
policy, efficiently magnifying the investment by means of micro-multiplier effects44. 
Providing the prerequisites of small-scale investments is desirable in neoliberal eyes, espe-
cially in the case of early developmental stages, as it unleashes the creative forms, in term 
expanding production possibilities, which will lay the groundwork for future growth 
(Thirlwall 2006:288). By providing possibilities to all individuals, independent of econom-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44!An!example!of!the!multiplier!effect!on!a!micro&level,!referring!to!the!fact!that!an!injection!of!extra!income!leads!to!
more!spending,!which!creates!more!income!and!so!on.!
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ic level, which is of great importance for UBI in addressing inequality, the trickle-up ap-
proach to economics opposes the acceptance of inequality inherent to the trickle-down 
understanding.!
Furthermore, the introduction of UBI in the pilot villages increased the general flow of 
money among the economically disadvantaged (UNICEF 2014:32ff). In regards to the pi-
lots, cash were previously a scarce commodity in the villages, whereby it is an obvious out-
set for social policy from a supply/demand perspective, in contrast to the schemes of food 
subsidies often apparent in the developing world. Along this line, it is worth noting that 73 
% of the recipients of the pilots that cited an increase in economic activity, attributed the 
increase directly to the UBI grant (Davala et. al. 2015:139). The sudden inflow of monetary 
liquidity from the UBI transfers has also enabled the most initially disadvantaged individ-
uals to enter into market relations. This is for instance evident in the 19 % increase in eco-
nomic activity for scheduled caste individuals 45  subject to the introduction of UBI 
(ibid.:149). UBI supplies recipients with liquidity to make investments, while countering 
the lack of demand from the worst-off individuals, thereby also seemingly affecting the 
alleviation of cultural bias towards scheduled caste individuals in the economic sphere.!
To sum up, the micro-effects of UBI does at large seem to be compatible with the neoliber-
al obligation to nurture the smooth functioning of the market, by increasing the reach of 
the market and provide liquidity at the individual level. Though, it must be noted that the-
se effects rest on a notion of bottom-up economics, contrary to the usual conceptions of 
growth creating policies within neoliberal reasoning as trickle-down.!!
6.3 Market Expansion 
The application of neoliberal policy prescriptions in state practice is presupposed by the 
assumption that markets in a state of equilibrium are efficient by creating ideal circum-
stances for economic growth (cf. 3.2.2.3.). Recognising that the perfectly equilibrial market 
is utopian as it is constantly exposed to market failures, neoliberal policy must revolve 
around state intervention to counter these failures, striving towards equilibrium in order 
to avoid more comprehensive measures (cf. 3.2.2.3.). An example of a state intervention !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 The scheduled caste individuals, also called ‘untouchable’ and Dalit, are disadvantaged in the Indian socie-
ty (Davala et. al. 2015:177).!
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that can be legitimised by neoliberal theory can thus appear in the matter of creating mar-
kets in areas where it was not previously present. The obligation of the neoliberal state to 
expand markets is in principle contradicting with justifications of UBI, emphasising the 
detachment of livelihood from market demand (cf. 3.1.2.). This theoretical dispute seems 
to result from different conceptions in regard to the distribution of opportunity provided 
by the equilibrial market, that UBI scholars in general identify as inadequate (Standing 
1999:351). Although this theoretical dispute appears unequivocal, a look into the results of 
the Indian pilots indicate that UBI, at least seemingly, supports the expansion of the mar-
ket by promoting the presence of private actors in areas that were previously dominated by 
public services. This can be detected for instance in the substantially increased usage of 
private healthcare,  private schools46 and insurance by the recipients of UBI (UNICEF 
2014: 127, 164f;  Davala et. al. 2015:109, 122). 
Another crucial matter of market expansion deriving from the pilots is the inclusion of in-
dividuals in the financial infrastructure. According to a paper by The World Bank on finan-
cial inclusion in the developing world, only 41 % of adults in developing countries have a 
bank account (Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper 2012:5). This is definitely problematic from a 
neoliberal point of view, as money and savings flowing outside the banking system, could 
be more tendentious to diffuse into the informal economies that is traditionally volumi-
nous in the developing world. The informal economy can thus be said to disturb the 
smooth operation of the market by making parallel sub-markets. It can be argued that the 
entitlement of a UBI has a potential to rectify this market impediment by creating an in-
centive for the individual to acquire a bank account, moving economic activity from the 
informal to the formal sector, ultimately expanding market on basis of adequate infor-
mation as well as improving financial citizenship of the poorest. This shift can also be ob-
served in the UBI pilots, where 53 % of the participants cited that they made savings in the 
bank, instead of keeping the money at home, compared to 30 % in the control villages that 
did not have the added incentive to open a bank account (UNICEF 2014:95).!
It must be noted though, that while these effects of inclusion and expansion appear desira-
ble from a neoliberal point of view, the strong imperative of minimal state interference vis-
á-vis the amount of macro-intervention and inevitable redistribution required to finance a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 The share of children attending private schools rose from 19 % to 29 % during the time of the UBI pilots.!
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UBI on a national level, most probably would result in the costs by far outweighing the 
benefits.!
6.4 Bureaucracy 
A significant subject of neoliberal policy is the matter of reducing state bureaucracy. Dur-
ing the existing paradigmatic era of neoliberalism, the policy prescription of de-
bureaucratisation involves streamlining the public sector in order to ensure greater 
productivity and efficiency (cf. 3.2.2.4.). This policy prescription has become synonymous 
with New Public Management (Hood 1995). !
One of the main critiques of UBI is that it is an unaffordable scheme that is too big of an 
economic burden (Wheeler 2015; Konczal 2013; Navabi 2013). The feasibility of UBI is 
discussed in the next chapter, but Basic Income Scholars counter argues that UBI actually 
involves the potential to reduce administrative costs because it is not devised to function in 
addition to existing schemes (cf. 3.1.3.). As it is unconditional, it does not require the as-
sessment of individual conditions that targeted and means-tested policies do, and can 
therefore largely be automated as long as the recipient has a bank account. Moreover, the 
application of multiple targeted and means-tested schemes requires resources and 
knowledge to navigate and apply for, implying the liability that they will not always reach 
the individuals they are intended for.!
In the case of India, UNICEF identified more than 1,200 different national social schemes, 
implemented by 15 different government departments, most of which are targeted and/or 
conditional, adding to this picture (UNICEF 2014:151). From this assessment, it is cited 
that only half of those believed to be eligible actually had the BPL-card47, and on the other 
hand, 89 % of those with an income ‘above average’ had some kind of poverty card 
(ibid.:160). This creates a notion that targeted welfare schemes in India have a considera-
ble risk of missing its intended target. It is also reasonable to assume that a high tally of 
conditional schemes, like in the case of the myriad of social benefit schemes in India, re-
quires a substantial amount of resources to administer. On the other hand, imagining 
many of these conditional schemes being replaced by an unconditional basic income, ad-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Below Poverty Line-card, used to apply for food subsidies and many other Indian poverty alleviation sche-
mes.!
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ministered by only one agency with supposedly automated transfers, could potentially be 
more cost-efficient to administer. Looking solely at the administrative properties, UBI thus 
seems to comply with the neoliberal principles of  increasing the efficiency of the admin-
istration and reducing the extent of the public sector. Moreover, the unconditionality of the 
UBI would, according to supporters, close a lot of inevitable disincentive traps caused by 
conditional schemes and predefined poverty thresholds, in term positively influencing la-
bour market efficiency. !
An example of inefficiency in conditional social benefits programmes can be drawn from a 
survey conducted in the initiation phase of the UBI pilots in India. The surveys showed 
that  38.1 % of respondents reported waiting times exceeding 6 months from applying till 
receiving their benefits (ibid.:157). This kind of rigidness of administration inhibits the 
individual from responding appropriately to fluctuating conditions in the market, leaving 
the individual with a lesser incentive to take risks in investment and employment, facing a 
possible long waiting time in case of failure. This would obviously not be the case in an un-
conditional basic income scheme. However, the assumption often endorsed by UBI advo-
cates, that it would be cost-neutral to replace existing plurality of schemes with an univer-
sal and unconditional basic income is contentious at best, even with the reduced admin-
istration in mind. This seems especially dubious in the context of development countries, 
with an often significantly high proportion of poor people. The feasibility of a UBI in its 
current state would under these circumstances most likely presuppose a considerable re-
distribution of wealth or alternative funding not compliant with the dominant view of state 
responsibilities, perfectly contrary to what is endorsed by neoliberal doctrine.!
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
In the analysis of the theoretical assumptions inherent to the concept of UBI contextual-
ised with examples from the pilots in Madhya Pradesh, this paper has investigated whether 
UBI was compatible with the structural framework of neoliberalism in terms of complying 
with its conception of the market and state. It can be concluded that the concept of UBI 
contradicts the neoclassical theoretical stance that the market creates general equilibrium 
since the state plays an intervening role in financing and facilitating the cash transfer. 
However, it can be argued that UBI supports the functioning of the market by increasing 
the reach of it, while providing liquidity for recipients. It is then plausible that UBI match 
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the more recent neoliberal acceptance of state interference than the draconian neoclassical 
theory of general equilibrium. Yet, while the analysis showed that implementing UBI theo-
retically would streamline a number of bureaucratic processes and thus increase efficiency 
within the public sector, it fundamentally contradicts the neoliberal idea of the market 
driven economy. !! !
! 55!
 
!!!!!!!!
 
 
7 Social Protection in 
the Neoliberal  
Development  
Paradigm 
The following chapter consists of an analytical dis-
cussion that applies and considers results from pre-
vious analysis in order to answer the problem 
statement. This discussion is established to examine 
Universal Basic Incomes entitlement as a form of So-
cial Protection within the neoliberal development 
paradigm based on a theoretical discussion supple-
mented by qualitative empirical data in the shape of 
an interview.!!!!
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7 Social Protection and the Neoliberal Development  
Paradigm 
7.1 Social Protection 
Over the course of the last decade, Social Protection has emerged as a framework for pov-
erty alleviation policy (UN 2012). In the 2010s, Social Protection has been focused towards 
establishing policy sectors within governments. Social Protection has allegedly become a 
recognised approach to social and economic development and is increasingly being adopt-
ed and implemented by national governments, international institutions and organisations 
such as The World Bank (2015a), UN (2012), IMF (2014), WTO (Mitra & Ranjan 2011) and 
ILO (2012). According to UN, Social Protection is defined as:!
“[...] a set of public and private policies and programmes undertaken by societies in re-
sponse to various contingencies to offset the absence or substantial reduction of income 
from work; to provide assistance to families with children as well as provide people with 
basic health care and housing” (UN 2000:4).!
In the 2015 UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)48, the world's development agen-
da was inter alia set out to improve the quality of “basic and maternal health care, educa-
tion, nutrition and environmental health” (ibid.). The UN System Task Team on the Post-
2015 UN Development Agenda argues that Social Protection could be a vital instrument in 
pursuing universal access on the aforementioned areas, thus establishing Social Protection 
as a powerful tool in the formulation of the post-2015 development agenda of Sustainable 
Development Goals49 (SDGs) (UN 2012:3). On top of that, ILO sees Social Protection as a 
way of realising Article 25 (1) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Every-
one has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself 
and of his family [...]” (Barrientos 2010:9; UN 1948). !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 The Millennium Development Goals are eight international development goals that all United Nations 
member states and twenty-three international organisations have committed to achieve by the year 2015.!
49 The Sustainable Development Goals are a set of proposed targets that are to replace the MDGs and relates 
to future international development.!
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This project acknowledges Social Protection as a core framework of recent development 
policy. Independent Consultant in Governance and Social Protection, Rasmus Schjødt, 
confirms this assumption and points to cash transfer programmes as one possible option:!
“There is now so much evidence of the positive effects of social protection programmes 
like cash transfers, that it is an attractive option for many countries. In middle income 
countries there will be pressure from national civil society organisations and with in-
creased government budgets and economic growth it will be hard for governments not to 
take initiatives to bring about a more fair distribution and more equitable development” 
(Appendix 1).!
This general outline of Social Protection serves as the outset of a discussion of the entitle-
ment of UBI, as a form of Social Protection, within the neoliberal development paradigm.!
7.2 Market Failures and Social Protection 
The results obtained in the analysis show that, in regards to the neoliberal paradigm, state 
intervention on the premises of the market can be tolerated to a certain degree to counter 
market failures. !
For UBI to align with this assumption, it could be framed as a Social Protection policy, 
with the purpose of perfecting market failures. This alignment is plausible because the 
concept, according to the previous analyses, can be said to create economic freedom and 
promote rational agency of individual in the economic sphere. By having individuals from 
the informal sector enter the formal sector and the market, market failures such as poverty 
can potentially be alleviated. The following section covers how Social Protection policy can 
lead to the elimination of market failures.!
In developing countries, most of the people living in poverty work in the informal economy 
and lack the possibilities to create demand within markets (WTO & ILO 2009; World Bank 
2013). This means that the poor, under these circumstances, are to some extent absent 
from the formal market economy. As neoliberalism perceives the market as the natural and 
driving force of individual progress, this apparent absence can be seen as an extensive 
market failure and subsequent growth impediment. If this absence from the market econ-
omy can be acknowledged as a failure of the market and an inhibitor of economic progress, 
it may be reasoned that the positive externalities of receiving a UBI, could legitimise a UBI 
policy as a response to this market failure. In previous analysis, it was thus reported that 
recipients in Madhya Pradesh were to some extent integrated into market economy by for 
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instance gaining increased liquidity and incentive to open bank accounts (cf.6.3.). Howev-
er, this form of state interference in market affairs that UBI  represents, does not entirely 
align within neoliberal thinking as it may induce dependency and may violate the general 
societal norm of reciprocal economic relations between individual and state.!
Ragnar Nurkse50 questioned the traditional market-oriented development approach and 
advocated for the need of a state to stimulate demand in developing countries, as the de-
mand does not meet supply due to a row of interdependent factors (Nurkse 2009:85ff). 
This interdependence is in this argumentation illustrated as a vicious cycle of poverty, 
where factors of low income, low productivity and low investment create low buying power 
and thereby demand (ibid.:102f). According to Nurkse, this combination of factors ob-
structs rational agency of individuals in poor economic situations. The underlying argu-
ment is that the market forces in their own respect are not impactful enough to break this 
vicious cycle in developing countries. Instead, Nurkse advocated for an actively intervening 
state to trigger an element in the cycle by a significant expansion of the market, in order to 
create capital accumulation (ibid.:107ff). Schjødt confirms this, commenting that it is “[...] 
clear that the market itself is not going to eradicate poverty, which everybody recognises 
these days” (Appendix 1). The understanding of the state/market relation endorsed by 
Nurkse can be said to represent a moderation of the traditional neoliberal idea that the 
market alone should facilitate economic progress. This moderation is indeed a contentious 
matter among neoliberal scholars, but there seem to be a dispute that has resulted in a 
progress towards a compromise, accepting the notion of growth generated by the market, 
but does not rule out the state as a facilitator and occasional active catalysing actor per se 
(cf. 3.2.2.4.). With the perspectives of Nurkse and Schjødt in mind, UBI could represent 
this triggering factor by employing a bottom-up approach to economic development 
(cf.6.2.). !
In traditional neoliberal behavioural theory,  it is not a question whether or not individuals 
will try to pursue economic progress. If  individuals act rationally and utility-maximise, the 
market will allow and enable this progress (cf. 3.2.2.3.). Following this line of thought, im-
poverishment can be a sign of individuals being inhibited from seizing their opportunities 
and thus acting irrational. Thus, the presence of poverty could be classified as impedi-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50!1907&1959:!Estonian!economist!
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ments for the smooth functioning of the market. Therefore, the quest of neoliberal devel-
opment policy must be to identify and eliminate these impediments, or market failures 
that cause disequilibrium, through limited  state intervention (cf. 3.2.2.3.).!If the premise 
for state intervention is to counter market-failures only as long as a disequilibrium is pre-
sent, Social Protection can function as a sort of ‘shock-therapy’, at least hypothetically, as-
sisting sustainable economic growth on a local scale by providing increased liquidity for 
people suffering from poverty, thus combating market failures. This could imply a Nurk-
sian stimulation of economic systems through a temporary UBI, where the state could 
serve as an economic catalyser, stabilising the market and promoting equilibrium. Howev-
er, it would, from a neoliberal point of  view, most likely still appear as a case of missing 
the nut with a sledgehammer, when applying such a drastic measure as a regular, universal 
and unconditional cash grant, in order to stimulate demand from the poorest. Especially 
when not recognising the alleged positive labour market effects from universal and uncon-
ditional grants voiced by some of the advocates of UBI (cf. 3.1.2.).!
7.3 Social Protection – Universal or Targeted? 
There are two central ideas concerning the scope of Social Protection - universal and tar-
geted. Universal Social Protection encompasses that every citizen should be entitled to so-
cial benefits, whilst targeted aims at selected groups of vulnerable individuals, determined 
through key social or economic factors (Slater & Farrington 2009:12). In this dichotomy, 
UBI naturally resides within the universal Social Protection programmes, as universalism 
is one of the core properties of the concept (cf. 3.1.3.).!
There has in recent years been a growing concern amongst economists and policy-makers, 
surrounding the issue of rising global inequality and the threat it poses to continuous eco-
nomic growth. The argument is that the increasing socio-economic polarisation of societies 
and subsequently shrinking middle class will cause a dilution of the main consumer group, 
thus resulting in declining demand (OECD 2014).  The question is then, if this shift in the 
economic discourse can serve as a window of opportunity for more universal kinds of So-
cial Protection? As described above, Social Protection is by now recognised by major de-
velopment actors as one useful tool in securing social and economic development, especial-
ly in developing countries, suffering from inequality and poverty. Considering this, UBI 
might potentially be the new tool within universal Social Protection, with the potential to 
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counter the economic impediment of inequality, through a bottom-up increase in demand. 
However, to follow in line with the research design of this study, UBI would still need to fit 
in a theoretical framework of neoliberalism, in order to have an entitlement as a tool of 
development. Neoliberalism advocates for a market-orientated approach to Social Protec-
tion, where the market is the driving element that leads economic progress and interfer-
ences from the state should only be carried out in order to eliminate potential market fail-
ures. Denouncing the case of UBI in future development policy, Schjødt identifies two ar-
guments against universal Social Protection programmes:!
“First, universal programmes are very expensive and it is tempting to try to reduce costs 
by reducing the number of beneficiaries. [...] Secondly, [...] it is difficult to make people 
understand why the government should give money to people who don't need it” (Appen-
dix:1).!
Accordingly, it is relevant to point out that neoliberalism in theorem would condemn the 
idea that a state distributes a UBI to all members of a society, because this could be classi-
fied as an unnecessary interference in the market. To transcend this theoretical dispute, 
one could point to a paper from DFID, claiming that developing countries in general spend 
between 1-2 % of their GDP on social transfers (DFID 2011:vi). This is substantially less 
than the 6 % that ILO models suggests as the minimum level, in order to achieve adequate 
minimum of transfer provision for at least 25 % of the population of a country (ibid.). Tak-
ing these calculations into account, the current level of expenditure leaves little space in 
terms of fiscal feasibility for a universal Social Protection scheme like UBI in a contempo-
rary development context, given that it should provide transfers in amounts that can pro-
mote livelihood at a subsistence level minimum (cf. 3.1.3.).!
This line of argumentation blueprints the neoliberal notion that only individuals who need 
economic assistance, should receive it. In line with neoliberal theory, targeted Social Pro-
tection schemes are thus desirable, since it may be argued that the state in this case acts to 
configure a market failure, helping people into the equilibrating market economy.!
As financing can obviously compose a severe barrier for further spending on Social Protec-
tion, the neoliberal development discourse still seems to revolve around targeted Social 
Protection policy prescriptions (UNRISD 2010:137). International Institutions, especially 
the World Bank, are pushing continuously for targeted Social Protection through their 
conceptual framework as presented in Social Risk Management (World Bank 2003) and 
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Resilience, Equity, and Opportunity (World Bank 2012). This firm belief in targeted Social 
Protection schemes coincides with the general sentiment in academic circles related to So-
cial Protection, where Schjødt describes how it, in his opinion, is “[...] rare to find a social 
protection expert who recommends a targeted approach [...]” (Appendix 1). !
The abovementioned line of reasoning clearly shows that UBI has a range of conceptual 
shortcomings in order for it to be compatible with neoliberal approaches to economic de-
velopment. The most obvious resort to this incompatibility would be a reconfiguration of 
the UBI, into a scheme acting merely as a temporary or targeted economic catalyser that 
can provide targeted basic income grants to selected impoverished individuals in develop-
ing countries. Albeit, making such configurations to the Universal Basic Income, leaving 
out the universality, and thereby denouncing the theoretical heritage of concept, would 
result in an inherently different concept, bearing a close resemblance to CCT’s and other 
similar programmes. In this light, UBI appears unfeasible as a universal Social Protection 
scheme within the current neoliberal development policy framework, without compromis-
ing the integrity of the concept entirely.!
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8 Conclusion 
The outset of this study was to answer the following problem statement:!
How is Universal Basic Income as a form of social protection compatible with the exist-
ing neoliberal development paradigm?!
The empirical analysis of the results from the Universal Basic Income pilots in Madhya 
Pradesh suggested that individuals gained economic freedom and generally utilised this 
freedom to act rational. This freedom appeared to have a degree of emancipating and em-
powering effect, though it was subject to neoliberal reluctance in theorem for inducing de-
pendency upon the state. It was neither possible to deny that the rational utilisation of 
Universal Basic Income could lead to ‘bad choices’ nor was influenced by non-quantifiable 
factors. !
While results from the UBI pilots suggested positive effects on market expansion and pro-
motion of entrepreneurial spirit, the structural analysis concludes that Universal Basic In-
come in general contradicts with neoliberal market and state assumptions. This is mainly 
due to the neoliberal view that the state should only intervene in order to configure market 
failures and not in the active role as redistributor presupposed by a Universal Basic In-
come scheme.!
The analytical discussion draws upon emerging agenda of Social Protection as a possible 
mediator between Universal Basic Income and the contemporary neoliberal development 
paradigm. New theoretical nuances are introduced in order to frame UBI as a possible bot-
tom-up catalyser of demand, in a world where increasing inequality poses a potential  
threat towards the prospects of continuous economic growth. Despite the promising fram-
ing, UBI remains seriously contended by neoliberal advocacy for targeted Social Protection 
approaches, as well as objections of lacking financial feasibility of the concept.!
The final conclusion of the study can be summarised as to say that Universal Basic Income, 
as a form of social protection, is only compatible with the neoliberal development para-
digm, insofar as core properties of UBI are configured or left out, violating the internal in-
tegrity of the concept.   
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9 Further Perspectives 
This paper opens a wide range of possibilities for further reflection. The following section 
seeks to cover a few of these by briefly sketching reflections on further perspectives that 
have occurred in the process of writing this paper. 
As stated in the conclusion, Universal Basic Income conflicts with a neoliberal notion of 
market-facilitated development as a prescription for combating poverty. But if a UBI can-
not fit into this frame, what other alternative development strategies might?!
A concept that resembles some of the bottom-up characteristics of UBI is micro loans, also 
referred to as microfinance or microcredit. By means of these privatised small-scale bank 
loans, millions of poor individuals around the world gained an opportunity to potentially 
break the shackles of poverty. The intention with these loans is to create incentive for es-
tablishing small businesses and to promote entrepreneurship as a tool to alleviate people 
from poverty (Danbolt 2006). Initially, the concept achieved widespread international 
acknowledgement and was used as a strategy for alleviating poverty in many countries 
(Roodman 2012). Despite the immediate success of the strategy in combating poverty and 
helping people create a better life, there have been substantial critique of the concept in the 
later years (Lützenkirchen & Weistroffer 2012:1ff). With the coming of the 2008 financial 
crisis, the concept saw its first major setback. Additional difficulties included the commer-
cialisation of loans, which according to critics caused severe over-indebtedness among 
great parts of the individuals, who were bestowed micro-loans. The concept was seemingly 
compatible with the nature of the market, and could thus be said to fit into the ruling eco-
nomic paradigm (ibid.).!
This seemingly ‘perfect’ fit, between a development strategy and the framework it needed 
to reside in, did not make micro-loans a new standard for economic development and pov-
erty alleviation ‘from below’. This adds an interesting perspective, further questioning the 
legitimacy of markets as the central driver in development policy.!
Sustainable Development has become a buzzword in international development as well as 
amongst international organisations, especially at UN, who just recently presented the 
post-2015 development goals and named them Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
(UN 2014). Although UBI as a concept does not per se address sustainability in the sense 
of managing scarce natural resources, it can be framed as more economically sustainable 
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perspective on development policies, in the sense that it can be said to promote stability 
and long-term planning in contrast to the fluctuation of markets. Among the SDGs, the 
explicit target of combatting inequality in and between countries has been listed alongside 
aims of fighting poverty and climate change. Moreover, other goals form the charter, as 
improvements in food sufficiency, health, sanitation and gender equality, are all aspects 
that UBI deals with. In this view, it could be interesting to investigate whether the new UN 
SDGs can open a gateway for UBI in post-2015 development policy.!
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10 Post Project Reflections 
The purpose of the following section is to make a post-project reflection on selected meth-
odological choices that have influenced on the final outcome of this study. In these ensuing 
sections, we will contemplate on what this project can provide to the contemporary debate 
on development, how the results obtained in this paper viewed respectively in a ‘theory 
versus praxis’ discussion. A final summary of the contribution or disruption of these reflec-
tions to the overall generalisability of our findings will conclude this section and ultimately 
comprise the closing remarks of this paper. !
Aligned with the very deductive mode of research, this project rests mainly on the theoreti-
cal choices of the research design. The fact that we decided to investigate the overall prob-
lem through a lense that was defined by neoliberal economic rationales has had a substan-
tial effect on the projectability of the key points in this paper. Moreover, our analytical ap-
proach necessitated assumptions that constrained the generalisability of our findings. One 
could argue; must development strategies really fit into a predefined theoretic framework 
for them to be feasible or implementable? Naturally, the chosen way of comprehending the 
problem does not lead towards conclusions that can be employed in a ‘real’ development 
context, as the project is mainly based on discussing theoretical assumptions against each 
other. This fact can both be interpreted as a strength as well as a weakness, depending on 
the onlooker. In the end, it comes down to making a vital choice, between tackling the 
problem as a practical or a theoretic one. A mainline in our discussions has been whether 
to approach UBI as a practical development strategy or as a theoretic framework that in 
some way had to comply with governing economic regimes. The former was chosen due to 
a recognition of overlying theory as a defining aspect when it comes to development. We 
resided with this approach, as we judged a more contextually dependent analysis of im-
plementability to be unable to provide substantial results, given the available secondary 
data and obvious scarce limitations of time and resources. One of the original motivating 
factors for choosing to look into the concept of UBI was to investigate whether this theory 
was merely building castles in the air, or if there really was a game-changing nature to it. 
This matter is partially left unresolved, insofar as the hard evidence, especially lack of eco-
nomic feasibility of a nationwide implementation, is still to be brought to the table.  How-
ever, in a theoretical or hypothetical sense, and based on the limited results of the pilots, 
the UBI remains persuasive to us as a development strategy. In terms of fulfilling the 
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promises of our problem statement, and with the presented assumptions in mind, we find 
the approach applied in this paper to be sufficient, as the paper conclusively investigates, 
analyses and discusses what it was originally intended to, and provides a somewhat nu-
anced answer inside the given framework. This project furthermore contains discussions 
that can be generalised to a wider theoretical perspective, such as the discussion of target-
ed or universal social protection. This is an ongoing debate amongst development re-
searchers, and the paper is actively commenting on the theoretical aspects of this specific 
dispute.!
Moreover, this project does not concern itself with quantifiable conclusions, and is distinc-
tively not focused on putting forth conclusions that can be generalised or projected onto a 
different reality. The problem was deemed to automatically disregard the possibility of 
practical generalisability in this case. On the contrary, the approach employed in the paper 
opens up the possibility for theoretical generalisations, as some of the conclusions indeed 
generalise on the feasibility of UBI in a neoliberal framework.!! !
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